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Michele Estrin Gilman *
INTRODUCTION
Is stealing a loaf of bread to feed a starving family of eight a
crime? Or, is poverty a defense? In Victor Hugo's classic, Les Mi-
sdrables, the protagonist, Jean VaIjean, commits this crime and is
sentenced to five years of hard labor.' Hugo clearly intends the
reader to sympathize with Vaijean. The punishment not only
seems grossly disproportionate to the crime, but Valjean also
seemingly had no other choice. While Valjean's crime may inspire
sympathy among readers (and musical theater aficionados alike),
it is widely assumed and accepted in our American criminal jus-
tice system that poverty is not a defense to crime.2 In 1971, Judge
David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia famously challenged this assumption, arguing,
in dissent to a decision upholding a murder conviction, that juries
should be allowed to consider a defendant's "rotten social back-
ground"-that is, how growing up under circumstances of severe
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at the Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative at George Washington University Law School
and the Class Crits IV conference at American University Washington College of Law.
1. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES 30 (Charles E. Wilbour trans., Blue Ribbon Books
1943) (1862).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting
the rotten social background defense).
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
environmental deprivation can subsequently influence a criminal
defendant's mental state and actions.3
In turn, Bazelon's dissent spurred a lively academic debate as
to whether the law should recognize a poverty defense, what such
a defense would look like, and how it would operate. The question
is presumed to be the stuff of the ivory tower; one scholar deemed
it "entirely the province of intellectuals engaged in scholarly de-
bate."4 Gone unnoticed in this debate is that one area of law rec-
ognizes a poverty defense to wrongful conduct, and this defense is
implicated in thousands of cases a year. In both civil and criminal
child neglect cases, various states recognize that conduct that
would otherwise be considered neglect is excused on account of a
parent's poverty.' In short, a poverty defense is not hypothetical.
The child neglect case law provides evidence about how the pov-
erty defense works in practice and can guide scholars-and more
importantly, lawmakers and courts-in considering whether to
extend a poverty defense to other areas of the law.
Considering a poverty defense is timely in light of our increas-
ing poverty rate and the correlation between poverty and crime.
As of 2010, more than fifteen percent of all Americans live below
the federal government's official poverty line,' which is $22,314
for a family of four (meaning that a family earning $22,315 is not
considered poor). Twenty million Americans, or 6.7 percent of the
population, live in extreme poverty, defined as those living at fifty
percent or less of the official poverty level.' Of people in the labor
force, 7.2 percent-or more than ten million people-do not earn
enough to be lifted out of poverty While the link between crime
and poverty is complex, statistics show unequivocally that poor
3. Id. at 960 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
4. Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental Deprivation (AKA RSB): A Tragedy, Not
a Defense, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 147, 170 (2011); see also Richard Delgado, The
Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) [hereinafter Delgado,
Wretched of the Earth] ("I take it as given that the country has not adopted a rotten social
background defense and is unlikely to do so anytime soon.").
5. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(44) (West
2010).
6. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 14 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/201 ipubs/p60-239.pdf.
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAu, POVERTY THRESHOLDS 2010, available at http://www.cen
sus.govfhhes/www/poverty/datalthreshldindex.html.
8. DENAVAS-WALT ETAL., supra note 6, at 19.
9. Id. at 15.
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people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. ° Fur-
ther, mass incarceration policies have a particularly devastating
impact on low-income, African American, urban communities, as
one-third of black men in their twenties are under supervision of
the criminal justice system." "By reducing parental capacity to
parent children, by further weakening already challenged family
structures and resources, and by making already disadvantaged
families and communities even less economically viable, incarcer-
ation helps to reify a social dynamic that is likely to encourage
further involvement in crime."" This was the cycle that Judge
Bazelon hoped to break, or at least expose, when he proposed the
"rotten social background" defense.
In addition to these dynamics, poverty is becoming increasingly
criminalized. Cities across America are making the daily tasks of
living for the homeless a crime, passing laws that forbid sleeping,
eating, begging, or sitting in public spaces."3 In some cities, it is
even illegal for groups or individuals to serve food to homeless
people. 4 At the same time, at least eighty percent of reporting ju-
risdictions that criminalize homelessness lack adequate shelter
space, public toilets, or storage facilities for the homeless to keep
their belongings." Thus, a lack of services creates the very condi-
tions of lawlessness."6 In addition, states, while intensifying wel-
10. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 55-58
(2011) (making a persuasive case for better data collection about the economic status of
persons involved in the criminal justice system); see also Stuart P. Green, Hard Times,
Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly Disadvantaged Offenders, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 43, 46-47 (2010) (analyzing Department of Justice figures); Andrew Karmen, Poverty,
Crime, and Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25, 29-30
(William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (listing theories that explain why pov-
erty leads to crime).
11. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272, 1281-82, 1285, 1291, 1293-94
(2004); see also Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities,
37 CRIME & JUST. 97, 100, 102 (2008).
12. Lawrence D. Bobo, Crime, Urban Poverty, and Social Science, 6 Du BOIS REV.:
Soc. Sci. RES. ON RACE 273, 276 (2009).
13. NAT'L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 6-8 (2011), available at http:/www.
nlchp.orgicontent/pubs/ll.14.11%20Criminalization%2OReport%20&%2OAdvocacy%2OMa
nual,%20FINALL.pdf.
14. Id. at 7, 38.
15. Id. at 7.
16. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Is It Now a Crime to be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009,
at WK9 (describing the arrest and jailing of a person in a homeless shelter for failing to
appear in court on a charge of criminal trespassing that arose from sleeping on a side-
walk).
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fare fraud prosecutions, increasingly treat poor people who resort
to public benefits as criminals, subjecting them to fingerprinting,
biometric imaging, ongoing surveillance, and drug testing as a
condition for receiving benefits.17 While debtors' prisons have
formally been abolished, the reality is that courts are increasingly
jailing poor people who cannot pay off their debts; and, in many
cases, these debtors are not even aware that they are being pur-
sued by creditors due to "sloppy, incomplete or even false docu-
mentation."8 A poverty defense has the potential to serve as a
corrective to these trends.
Scholars have articulated at least three differing conceptions of
a poverty defense, each of which are reflected in the child neglect
case law. In some cases, the child neglect poverty defense most
closely resembles traditional criminal law defenses of either ne-
cessity or duress, in which external forces that compel a defend-
ant to engage in wrongful conduct lessen or extinguish culpabil-
ity. 9 Other approaches reflect Judge Bazelon's idea of rotten
social background, in which an impoverished upbringing renders
a parent unable to fulfill parenting duties. 0 In a third approach,
the poverty defense embodies social forfeit theory, in which socie-
ty's tolerance of severe economic inequality deprives society of the
moral authority to blame deprived defendants for their conduct.
Regardless of the court's theoretical underpinning, the poverty
defense rarely succeeds unless the court has a sophisticated un-
derstanding of poverty and how it leads to neglect. Thus, this ar-
ticle argues that not only is the poverty defense an established
(albeit overlooked) feature of American law that can be expanded
17. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Poverty Law, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1389 (2012); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 659, 674-79 (2009).
18. Jessica Silver- Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors' Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 2011, at Cl (noting that more than a third of states allow borrowers who do not
pay their bills to be jailed). In addition, states are increasingly charging criminal justice
user fees; defendants are required to pay for "everything from probation supervision, to
jail stays, to the use of a constitutionally required public defender. Every stage of the crim-
inal justice process, it seems, has become ripe for a surcharge." ALICIA BANNON ET AL.,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 4 (2010),
available at http:tlbrennan.3cdn.net/c6lO8O2495d9Oldac3-76m6vqhpy.pdf.
19. David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge to Homeless Criminali-
zation as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 487, 501-02 (1994).
20. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 403-
04 (1976) [hereinafter Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Law].
21. Green, supra note 10, at 54-55.
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into other areas, but also that it will not fulfill its potential with-
out a rich conception of poverty.
The article proceeds as follows. Section I explains the major
theoretical justifications for excusing poor defendants for commit-
ting wrongful conduct and sets forth the objections to a poverty
defense. Section II provides the context for the poverty defense in
child neglect cases, exploring the link between poverty and child
neglect and the scope of the poverty defense. Section III analyzes
how courts interpret the poverty defense in child neglect cases,
demonstrating that all three theoretical approaches to a poverty
defense are found in the case law. As Section III explains, a
court's conception of poverty drives its interpretation of the pov-
erty defense. Courts that see poverty as rooted in structural caus-
es are more amenable to the defense than courts that view pov-
erty as a result of behavioral failings. Section IV draws lessons
from how the poverty defense is applied in child neglect cases in
order to inform other areas of the law. Section IV concludes that
the poverty defense is not the impossible pipedream painted by
its critics. Nevertheless, the defense has not fulfilled its potential
because many courts lack a sophisticated understanding of how
poverty is related to neglect. Moreover, courts are often uncom-
fortable with the implications of the poverty defense and how it
conflicts with accepted norms of individual culpability. According-
ly, Section IV provides ideas for strengthening the poverty de-
fense and suggests areas for its expansion.
I. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCUSING
POOR DEFENDANTS
Although the conventional wisdom is that there is no poverty
defense, progressive scholars have taken Judge Bazelon's lead
and attempted to construct the theoretical scaffolding for building
one. Under the first theory, "rotten social background" ("RSB"),
also known as "severe environmental deprivation," can cause a
defendant to commit a crime, thereby diminishing his responsibil-
ity, similar to a defense of diminished capacity or insanity. The
RSB defense is also justified with regards to social forfeit 'theory,
which holds society morally responsible for its socio-economic
failures. Under the second theory, current economic hardship can
create conditions of coercion such that a poor person has no
meaningful alternative other than to commit 'an offense. While
20131
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the RSB defense focuses on how a person's history of deprivation
shapes responses to present stimuli, the economic coercion de-
fense focuses instead on how current deprivation impacts deci-
sion-making. While theorists assert that the law (either rightly or
wrongly) fails to recognize either form of these poverty defenses,
in fact, both of these versions of the poverty defense have been
recognized within the law of child neglect. The case law suggests
that a poverty defense can not only help individual poor defend-
ants but also benefit society more widely through redistributive
consequences that can ultimately reduce crime. This section ex-
amines the theoretical models for a possible poverty defense, as
well as the objections to these proposals.
A. Rotten Social Background! Severe Environmental Deprivation
1. The Theory
In 1973, D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon introduced the theo-
ry of an RSB defense in his dissent in United States v. Alexan-
der." In that case, an African American defendant was convicted
of killing two unarmed Marines after one of them hurled racial
epithets at the defendant and his friends in a hamburger shop."
A psychiatrist who examined the defendant testified at trial that
the defendant was delusional due to a preoccupation with racial
injustice and "the idea that racial war was inevitable."24 Accord-
ingly, the psychiatrist concluded that the defendant may have
had an "irresistible impulse to shoot" after the victim called him a
"black bastard."25 This emotional disorder was rooted in the de-
fendant's childhood, during which time he was raised by a single
mother in a low-income neighborhood in the Watts neighborhood
of Los Angeles in a crowded home with little money, attention, or
love.26
Accordingly, defense counsel sought to argue that defendant's
"rotten social background" conditioned him to respond to certain
stimuli such that he had no meaningful choice when targeted
22. 471 F.2d 923, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 926.
24. Id. at 957.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 957-58.
[Vol. 47:495
THE POVERTY DEFENSE
with racial insults.7 However, the trial court instructed the jury
to ignore any evidence related to the defendant's RSBY. In dis-
sent, Judge Bazelon contended that denying the RSB defense was
an error because the denial stripped the jury of the opportunity to
consider the "crucial, functional question--did the defendant lack
the ability to make any meaningful choice of action[?]"" For
Judge Bazelon, a RSB could cause an impairment similar to a
mental illness, thereby rendering defendants less culpable."0
Judge Bazelon acknowledged the difficulty of permitting an
RSB defense, especially when dealing with a defendant who has
committed a violent crime and may still be dangerous. 1 He iden-
tified four possible approaches for dealing with defendants suffer-
ing from RSB: (1) confinement, (2) release, (3) therapeutic con-
finement, and (4) preventative detention." None of these were
satisfactory.3" First, confinement is inconsistent with a lack of re-
sponsibility. 4 Second, release would be publicly and politically
unpalatable.35 Third, therapeutic confinement may be pointless
for a defendant who is not mentally ill.36 Fourth, preventative de-
tention could lead to huge swaths of the poor being detained in
order to prevent crime. 7 Despite the unsettled ramifications of
recognizing an RSB defense, Judge Bazelon argued that permit-
ting the defense would force society to examine the causes of
crime and to consider "whether income redistribution and social
reconstruction are indispensable first steps toward solving the
problem of violent crime." 8
Professor Richard Delgado subsequently fleshed out the pa-
rameters of an RSB defense.39 Pulling together extensive social
27. Id. at 959; cf. Delgado, Wretched of the Earth, supra note 4, at 7-8 (arguing that
the use of the term RSB "is a distancing move" and preferring the term severe environ-
mental deprivation).
28. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 959 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 961.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 961-62.
32. Id. at 962-64.
33, Id.
34. Id. at 962.
35. Id. at 963.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 964.
38. Id. at 965.
39. Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background" Should the Criminal Law Recognize
a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQ. 9, 11-12 (1985) [hereinaf-
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science data, he explored the correlations between poverty and
crime, noting that while the vast majority of poor people do not
violate the law, most criminal offenders are from poor back-
grounds. As he stated, "An environment of extreme poverty and
deprivation creates in individuals a propensity to commit crimes,"
such that punishing the individual is unfair.4 In other words,
"blame is inappropriate when a defendant's criminal behavior is
caused by extrinsic factors beyond his or her control."4 The re-
search relied on by Professor Delgado shows that crime is usually
caused by frustration-aggression, which can result from inequali-
ty.43 In turn, inequality is generated and reinforced through pov-
erty, unemployment, poor living conditions, bad schools, police
brutality, violent neighborhoods, alternative value systems, sin-
gle-parent families, and racism.44 When impoverishment renders
a defendant unable to control her conduct, the RSB defense ex-
cuses that conduct. 5
In addition to the idea that RSB impacts behavior, Judge Ba-
zelon also suggested a social forfeit justification for an RSB de-
fense. He contended that society loses its moral justification for
punishing poor criminal defendants when it refuses to remedy
conditions of inequality.46 As he stated, "[I]t is simply unjust to
place people in dehumanizing social conditions, to do nothing
about those conditions, and then to command those who suffer,
'Behave-or else!"' 7 In short, the law should "convictU only when
it can condemn."8 As Professor Delgado elaborates, society loses
ter Delgado, Rotten Social Background]; Delgado, Wretched of the Earth, supra note 4, at
1, nn.6-7.
40. Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 10. The social science data
on the connection between crime and poverty has strengthened considerably since the
1970s. See infra notes 333-40 and accompanying text (discussing Haney's article).
41. Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 54.
42. Id. at 55.
43. Id. at 23-24.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 63-64. Three other categories of excusing conditions are when conduct is
involuntary; when the conduct is voluntary, but the actor does not perceive its conse-
quences; or when the conduct is voluntary but the actor does not see it as wrong. Id. (citing
Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
222 (1982)).
46. See Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 401-02.
47. Id.
48. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law: A Rejoinder to Professor
Morse, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1270 (1976) [hereinafter Baselon, Rejoinder].
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its right to punish those who lack "a realistic chance to act in a
socially acceptable way."49
The idea of social forfeit is a variation on social contract theory.
Under this theory, the legal system is part of a larger social con-
tract in which citizens agree to abide by the rules of the state as
enforced by the government in return for safety and security.'
When individuals break this social contract, they gain an unfair
advantage and must be punished." Conversely, when the rules of
society are unjust, the social contract is broken, and citizens are
no longer obliged to follow the rules." Under a Rawlsian interpre-
tation of social contract theory, rules are unjust when they would
not be chosen by those in the original position, that is, under a
veil of ignorance.53 In other words, Rawls envisions the rules that
people would choose if they did not know their places in society,
their social classes, their talents or abilities, or even their person-
al beliefs as to how they should lead their lives. 4 This veil of igno-
rance ensures that parties in the original position will agree to
principles that will protect those at the bottom of the social lad-
der.5 Rawls concludes that the resultant rules would guarantee
equal opportunity as well as fair distribution of social and eco-
nomic resources, among other things." Under social contract the-
ory, if unfair rules contribute to poverty and if society fails to
remedy those disparities, then the poor are not bound to follow
society's mandates. Accordingly, a poverty defense reinforces the
rules of the social contract.
As discussed in detail below, courts that use an RSB theory in
the child neglect context take into account factors such as the
parent's age and background, educational level, employment his-
tory, housing options, neighborhood environment, physical and
mental health, and family and community support. In this ap-
proach, the poverty defense does more than excuse a parent who
lacks money to purchase basic necessities such as diapers and
food. Indeed, most child neglect cases are far more complicated,
49. Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 74.
50. See Green, supra note 10, at 54.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id.
53. JOHN RAWLS, ATHEORY OF JUSTICE 15-19 (1999).
54. See id. at 17-18.
55. See id. at 118.
56. See id. at 266-67.
20131
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with families facing multiple barriers and deprivations. Further,
courts that give the RSB approach a social forfeit gloss also con-
sider what actions the child welfare agency has taken to support
the parents and how the parents have responded to any offered
assistance. Consistent with Judge Bazelon's vision, the RSB ap-
proach in child neglect cases consists of a holistic examination of
the family within its larger societal context. Nevertheless, as Ba-
zelon predicted, defendants rarely prevail. 7
2. Critics of RSB
In the Alexander majority opinion, Judge Carl E. McGowan re-
jected the concept of an RSB defense, while acknowledging that
"[t]he tragic and senseless events giving rise to these appeals are
a recurring byproduct of a society which, unable as yet to elimi-
nate explosive racial tensions, appears equally paralyzed to deny
easy access to guns."58 Although "[the ultimate responsibility for
the[] deaths reaches far beyond these appellants[,]" courts "ad-
minister a system of justice which is limited in its reach."9 In
short, current law "define[s] criminal accountability narrowly."
Like Judge Bazelon, Judge McGowan understood that poverty
leads to crime, but he maintained a more constrained view of the
court's role in administering justice.
Similarly, several scholars have also argued that the RSB de-
fense should not be adopted because it does not fit within current
conceptions of criminal justice. They make four main arguments
against the RSB defense: (1) growing up with an RSB does not
reduce individual responsibility for criminal acts; (2) an RSB de-
fense is practically impossible to apply; (3) an RSB defense can
lessen public safety; and (4) the goals of the RSB defense are out-
side the bounds of the criminal law. 1 Stephen Morse has argued
57. See Bazelon, Rejoinder, supra note 48, at 1271 (noting that mass acquittals based
on an RSB defense are unlikely).
58. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Angela P. Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times, 2
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 131, 138-41 (2011) (explaining that the defense has not been
adopted because it conflicts with current cultural norms such as neoliberalism and the cul-
ture of crime control); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Leg-
islatures Ignore Richard Delgado's Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
79, 121 (2011) ("[The RSB defense violates] basic precepts of mens rea, entity liability,
moral culpability, and duty toward others that violate our whole sense of what defines
Vol. 47:495
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against recognizing an RSB defense on the grounds that the poor,
like all people, are moral agents responsible for the decisions they
make while acting within a world of constrained choices.62 Unlike
children or the insane, people from a RSB have "basic knowledge
of the rules and are capable of rational reflection ... because they
have the general capacity to ... be guided by reason."63 Morse ex-
plains that if causation or determinism were an excuse to crime,
no one would be responsible for their behavior, which is a result
that society cannot tolerate.64 "No coherent, workable society can
give legal permission to people to act according to their own pri-
vate or subjective moral code. This would abandon the rule of law
and undermine social safety." 5 Moreover, an RSB defense is both
over- and under-inclusive because "many [RSB] sufferers do not
suffer from [impaired behavioral controls] and many non-[RSB]
sufferers may have such difficulties."66 As a result, "it seems pat-
ronizing and demeaning to claim that all victims of [RSB] are im-
paired human beings." 7
Second, opponents contend that the RSB defense is practically
impossible to prove and apply. Professor Paul Robinson contends
that while growing up under an RSB may shape individual be-
havior, the strength of the link between environment and crime is
unclear." Simply put, correlation is not causation. He states,
"There is little empirical support for the proposition that a gener-
ally impoverished upbringing can itself cause a specific crime so
as to render the offender blameless."6 For instance, the defendant
in Alexander may have killed the Marine due to his own "selfish-
ness, arrogance, and pride," as much as due to an RSB.7s Third,
American criminal law."); Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence is Not a Justification, in FROM
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 98-99 ("The law.., is not about
to recognize a class of defense whose general tendency ... would be to call into question
the legitimacy of the general legal rules of property in a society."). These authors do not
address the poverty defense in neglect cases.
62. Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 114, 149.
63. Id. at 147.
64. Id. at 149-50
65. Morse, supra note 4, at 151.
66. Id. at 150.
67. Id.
68. Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Crimi-
nal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and 'Rotten Social Back-
ground," 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 53, 58 (2011).
69. Id. at 59.
70. Id. at 75.
2013]
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opponents also query how the criminal justice system would han-
dle RSB defendants, many of whom might be dangerous if re-
leased and most of whom have harmed victims sharing RSBs. 7 1
Fourth, opponents view the RSB defense as an illegitimate
means of advancing redistributive aims.72 Morse argues that the
purpose of the criminal law is to condemn and blame; it is not de-
signed to serve social welfare goals. 3 Social redistribution should
come from the political branches; not courts, and it is a
"pipedream" to think that an RSB defense would transform socie-
ty.74 Moreover, he adds that most people in our democracy would
not agree that society is so unjust as to compromise its legitima-
cy.75 Thus, he rejects social forfeit justifications, asking: "How is
society to be put on trial so that juries understand that society is
on trial and they are not simply hearing terribly sad stories of
tragic life circumstances?"76 He points out that many law-abiding
jurors may come from similarly disadvantaged backgrounds and
thereby reject the defense." In such cases, "[slhould we abandon
the defense, or should we keep trying at great expense fruitlessly
to convict society?' 78 In lieu of the RSB defense, Morse argues for
criminal justice reforms that fit within traditional notions of the
criminal law, but that would lessen the disproportionate impact
of criminal law on poor people, such as decriminalizing low-level
drug crimes and reforming draconian sentencing policies. 9
71. See id. at 61. For a response to these and other arguments, see generally Morse,
supra note 4.
72. See Morse, Deprivation and Desert, supra note 62, at 115; see also Morse, supra
note 4, at 148.
73. Morse, supra note 62, at 115.
74, Morse, supra note 4, at 158; see also William C. Heffernan, Social Justice
/Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 47,
55, 58 (arguing that it is inappropriate for judges to make decisions based on their concep-
tions of social justice since there is no shared conception of social justice in the United
States).
75. Morse, supra note 62, at 153.
76. Morse, supra note 4, at 157.
77. Id.
78. Id.




Some have also advocated for a poverty defense that mirrors
existing defenses, such as necessity or duress."0 These defenses
exculpate an actor due to her blamelessness.' A justification de-
fense, such as necessity, exculpates otherwise wrongful actions
that benefit society, whereas an excuse defense, such as duress,
renders an actor blameless, even if her actions have harmed soci-
ety." In other words, necessity approves the underlying offense;
duress simply excuses it.83 While the defenses differ in their spe-
cifics, they both reflect the idea that constrained choices can have
coercive aspects that lessen a person's culpability. The poverty
defense similarly acknowledges the coercive effects of deprivation.
Under the necessity defense, a person commits what would
otherwise be a crime due to a choice between two evils: he must
violate the criminal law or someone will suffer a greater harm. 4
In such circumstances, "the law prefers that he avoid the greater
evil by bringing about the lesser evil.""5 Classic scenarios, for in-
stance, include those when a person kills one person in order to
save two or more or when a firefighter destroys property to pre-
vent the spread of fire.86 Courts have been reluctant to recognize
economic hardship as creating conditions of necessity, reasoning
that poor people usually have some alternatives other than com-
mitting a crime. 7 Thus, if Jean Valjean "could find temporary
sustenance by, say, attending a soup kitchen, then Ohe is unlikely
to be able to claim the defense" against a charge of stealing food.88
The necessity defense is a difficult standard to meet, and there
80. See Antonia K. Fasanelli, Note, In Re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation
of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L.
REV. 323, 324-25 (2000); Smith, supra note 19, at 501.
81. PAUL ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 25(a) (2011).
82. Id. § 25(d).
83. Smith, supra note 19, at 501.
84. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.1 (4th ed. 2003).
85. Id. § 10. 1(a). The defense requires: (1) the defendant acted to avoid serious harm;
(2) there were no adequate lawful means to escape the threatened harm; and (3) the harm
avoided was greater than that caused by breaking the law. See id. §10.1.
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 & cmt. 1.
87. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
88. See Green, supra note 10, at 51.
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are no reported cases in which a poor person was acquitted on
economic grounds under the necessity defense."9
A defense of duress excuses a person who commits a crime be-
cause he is subject to such coercion that no reasonable person
could be expected to resist.' The rationale for excusing the
wrongful conduct is that the defendant, facing the threat of harm,
"somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in ques-
tion."' In such circumstances, "punishment serves neither the de-
terrent nor the condemnatory purposes of the criminal justice
system."" To argue duress, a defendant must establish a reason-
able fear of imminent harm. 3 As with the defense of necessity,
courts hold that economic hardship is not the sort of imminent
harm that justifies crime."
For critics of a poverty defense, this is how it should be. They
contend that deprivation alone does not satisfy the predicates for
necessity or duress."' Consider a person, such as Jean Valjean,
who commits larceny because she is threatened with imminent
death or starvation as a result of not being able to afford food or
medicine. The argument against a necessity defense is that "min-
imal welfare and medical care is available to virtually anyone in
the United States, and our law does not consider it objectively
reasonable, for example, to steal to obtain better medical care or
food than would be available through the welfare system."'" As for
89. Id. Cases rejecting a necessity defense include: Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d 573,
574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ("Economic necessity is no justification for a positive criminal
offense."); State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) (ruling that hungry, unemployed
people were guilty of larceny when they stole groceries) ("[E]conomic necessity has never
been accepted as a defense to a criminal charge. The reason is that, were it ever counte-
nanced, it would leave to the individual the right to take the law into his own hands."). Cf
Rex v. Holden, (1809) 168 Eng. Rep. 607 (K.B.) 607 (describing the trial, conviction, and
execution of seven persons for creating forged bank notes) ("[T]hey were all indigent and,
many of them very distressed persons, who were tempted to engage in this criminal prac-
tice, by the necessities of the moment.").
90. See LAFAVE, supra note 84, § 9.7.
91. Id. § 9.7(a); see also ROBINSON, supra note 81, § 177(a); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09
cmt. 2 (1985).
92. ROBINSON, supra note 81, § 177.
93. LAFAVE, supra note 84, § 9.7(b). Several commentators assert that an excuse de-
fense such as duress is a better fit than a necessity defense for poor defendants alleging
that poverty lessens their criminal culpability. See Delgado, Rotten Social Background,
supra note 39, at 49; Smith, supra note 19, at 501-02 (arguing that the duress defense
does not require society to approve the underlying conduct, only to excuse it).
94. ROBINSON, supra note 81, § 177(c)(b).
95. See Morse, supra note 62, at 141-42.
96. Id. at 142.
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duress, a lack of economic opportunity is not a sufficient threat to
compel crime. "A constrained choice ... is not the equivalent of no
choice or a forced choice.""7
These critics may overstate the strength of our safety net, as at
least one court has concluded. A California court has recognized
that a necessity defense should be available in cases involving vi-
olations of anti-homeless ordinances. 8 The Eichorn court held
that a homeless person arrested for sleeping in public was enti-
tled to a necessity defense when there were no shelter beds avail-
able and economic forces were to blame for the defendant's home-
lessness.' As the court stated, "[R]easonable minds could differ
whether [the] defendant acted to prevent a 'significant evil.' Sleep
is a physiological need, not an option for humans.""° Post-
Eichorn, California courts have rejected a necessity defense in
cases involving poor defendants who commit violent crimes, rea-
soning that poverty does not "constitute a necessity [defense] jus-
tifying the commission of burglary" or armed robbery.' Although
the California courts supposedly remain open to considering the
necessity defense for crimes of homelessness, there is no evidence
that the defense has ever been used successfully.0 2 By contrast,
the poverty defense in child neglect cases has been applied far
more often, and some courts have recognized that the effects of
97. Id. at 143.
98. In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
99. Id. at 540 (citing People v. Slack, 258 Cal. Rptr. 702, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).
100. Id. at 539. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that Los Angeles violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment when it forbade sitting, sleeping, or lying on the street at any time of day.
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting joint motions to dismiss the appeal). The court rea-
soned that the ordinance punished the status of homelessness, which can be involuntary
and leaves the homeless with no choice but to sleep in public. Id. at 1136-37.
101. People v. Carter, No. E049455, 2010 WL 5232940, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2010) (distinguishing Eichorn from burglaries committed in the name of necessity); People
v. Carrera, No. D035410, 2001 WL 1356993, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2001) (finding
that public policy considerations do not support application of the necessity defense to jus-
tify armed robbery).
102. See Elizabeth M. M. O'Connor, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Criminalization of
Homelessness: Factoring Individual Accoantability into the Proportionality Principle, 12
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 233, 260 (2007). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has pointed out the limita-
tions of a necessity defense to crimes of homelessness, explaining that the practical reali-
ties of being homeless make it unlikely that defendants will have the knowledge or re-
sources to raise a necessity defense in court, and that even with counsel, defendants are
likely to take a plea rather than to subject themselves to further pre-trial jail time. Jones,
444 F.3d at 1130-31 (holding that the availability of a necessity defense does not deprive
plaintiffs of standing to raise a constitutional challenge to anti-homeless legislation).
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poverty sharply limit the options available to poor parents.' °3
These cases show how a coercion-based poverty defense might op-
erate in other contexts.
II. POVERTY AND CHILD MALTREATMENT
In the area of child neglect, the theoretical bases for a poverty
defense have moved into practice. At least seven states recognize
a poverty defense in criminal child neglect cases, while more than
half the states recognize a poverty defense at some point in civil
neglect cases.0 4 Civil child neglect cases are typically heard in
family court and, if in the best interests of the child, the state can
move for termination of parental rights; criminal child neglect
cases can result in criminal penalties, such as incarceration.
10 5
Parents can be subject to both types of proceedings simultaneous-
ly.106 Cases interpreting the civil statutes are instructive because
child neglect proceedings share many features with criminal law.
The ultimate sanction for violating a civil child neglect law can be
termination of the parent-child relationship, which has been
called the "civil death penalty."' 7 Moreover, in these termination
cases, which are usually brought and prosecuted by attorneys for
the state,100 parents have a right to an attorney,0 9 and the Su-
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dee, 110 N.E. 287, 288 (Mass. 1915) (arguing that
hailing the indigent into criminal court because they are "unavoidably disabled" from
providing support is a "grave injustice"): In re Daniels, 953 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Nev. 1998)
(Springer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that welfare proceedings rarely address the root cause
of poverty leaving the parents unable to support their child despite their desire to do so);
In re A.L.B., No. M2004-01808-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1584065, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
6, 2005) (explaining that poverty, without evidence of harm to the children, does not pro-
vide sufficient cause to separate children from their biological parents); Doria v. Tex. Dep't
of Human Res., 747 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex. App. 1988) (discussing the mother's endeavors
to support her children despite her economic situation).
104. See infra notes 179, 188 and accompanying text.
105. See WILLIAM G. JONES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., WORKING WITH THE
COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 37 (2006); Theresa Hughes, Discovering the Undiscoverable
in Child Protective Proceedings: Safety Planning Conferences and the Abuse of the Right to
Counsel, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 429, 433, 471 (2006).
106. See Hughes, supra note 105, at 471.
107. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (referring to the termination
of the parent-child relationship as "tantamount to a 'civil death penalty"); In re P.C., 62
S.W.3d 600, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); In re K.D.L., 58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002); In re
Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2002); see also In re J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186, 191-92 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
while neglect and criminal proceedings have different purposes, the protections for par-
ents and children are similar to those made available to criminal defendants).
108. See Hughes, supra note 105, at 433 (describing role of child welfare agency in pur-
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preme Court of the United States has imposed a heightened
"clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof.11 For these rea-
sons, both civil and criminal child neglect cases discussing the
poverty defense shed light on whether, when, and how poverty
should excuse wrongful conduct. To appreciate the role that the
poverty defense plays in family and criminal courts, it is critical
to understand how child neglect correlates to poverty. In other
words, why would society ever excuse neglectful parents?
A. The Scope and Concept of Child Neglect
In 2010, 436,321 children were found to be maltreated, of
whom 78.3 percent suffered neglect."' Neglect far outranks other
forms of child maltreatment, such as physical abuse (17.6 per-
cent), sexual abuse (9.2 percent), or psychological maltreatment
(8.1 percent).1 Under prevailing definitions, abuse results from
an affirmative, intentional act, while neglect results from a par-
ent's failure to act."3 Notably, the poverty defense is not available
in child abuse cases, likely because child abuse is considered more
volitional."'
The social service profession recognizes various forms of ne-
glect, the most common of which is physical neglect (including
abandonment or lack of food, clothing, or hygiene)."' State legal
suing dependency cases); see also David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal
Orders of Protection and Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1449
(2010) (arguing that family court procedural protections should be utilized in criminal ne-
glect proceedings).
109. See Vivek S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent's Right to Counsel in Child Welfare
Cases, 28 CHILD L. PRAC. 97, 103 (2009) ("Although no federal statutory right to parent's
counsel exists, fortunately most states have followed the Court's guidance and provide
counsel to parents in dependency and termination proceedings."). Children are also ap-
pointed an advocate. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 648 (2006).
110. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982).
111. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 7, 24 (2010) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010]. In the same year,
there were approximately 3.6 million reports of child maltreatment, involving almost six
million children. Id. at 20.
112. Id. at 24.
113. Peter J. McGovern, Redefining Child Neglect An American Perspective, 7 AM. J.
FAM. L. 207, 212 (1993).
114. See Dorothy Roberts, The Ethics of Punishing Indigent Parents, in FROM SOCIAL
JUSTICE To CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 165.
115. See DIANE DEPANFILIS, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CHILD NEGLECT: A GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 11-12 [here-
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definitions of neglect in the civil context vary."0 Some definitions
of neglect focus on the conduct of the parents; others focus on
harm or a risk of harm to the child; while still others combine el-
ements of both. Regardless, because neglect is generally consid-
ered a failure to act, the child welfare system examines the cul-
pability of parents in assessing alleged deficiencies." 7 Defining
neglect is usually further complicated because there is no consen-
sus on the minimum requirements of caring for children or how
certain actions and inactions affect the well-being of children."8
Furthermore, conceptions of neglect are culturally shaped,"9 and
societal expectations of parenting change over place and over
time."0 One hundred years ago, many American children lived in
unheated homes with dirt floors alongside insects and rodents,
and these conditions were not considered unusual. Today, such
conditions would likely trigger an investigation by child protec-
tive services.
Despite this lack of definitional consensus, child welfare ex-
perts agree that neglect can harm children physically, intellectu-
ally, emotionally, and socially.'2' The extent of these injuries de-
pends on a range of factors, such as the frequency, duration, and
inafter CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE]. Other forms of neglect include the following: medical ne-
glect (denial or delay in seeking health care), inadequate supervision (leaving child alone
or exposing them to hazards), emotional neglect (inadequate affection, exposure to abuse,
drug abuse by child), and educational neglect (truancy or failure to enroll). Id. at 11-14.
116. Id. at 9. As a condition of receiving federal funds, states must incorporate the
standards in the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"). 42 U.S.C. §
5106(b) (2006). CAPTA sets the definitional floor for child abuse and neglect as "any re-
cent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, seri-
ous physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act
which presents an imminent risk of serious harm." 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g). Above this floor,
states can devise their own definitions. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 9.
117. See CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 9.
118. Id. The definition of child neglect is widely perceived as vague and leaving too
much discretion in the hands of decisionmakers. See Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Wein-
stein, Before It's Too Late: Neuropsychological Consequences of Child Neglect and Their
Implications for Law and Social Policy, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 565 (2000).
119. See Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster Sys-
tem, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incen
tives-and.cultural-bias-fuel-foster-system (describing how Native American children make
up half of South Dakota's foster care population despite being less than fifteen percent of
the population). Tribal leaders have told NPR that "what social workers call neglect, is
often poverty; and sometimes native tradition." Id.
120. See David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the 'Tree Range Kid" Is Overpro-
tective Parenting the New Standard of Care? 2012 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (de-
scribing changing norms of parenting).
121. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 21.
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severity of the neglect; the age and gender of the child; the rela-
tionship between the child and the caregiver; and the presence of
protective factors, such as the resilience of the child.22 In the
worst case scenario, neglect can lead to death. In 2010, there were
1560 child fatalities resulting from maltreatment, and 32.6 per-
cent of these fatalities resulted solely from neglect.1 At the same
time, removal of children from their homes has financial, emo-
tional, and social costs. 124
Society pays a cost for the consequences of neglect as well. Mil-
lions of dollars are spent annually on maintaining the child wel-
fare and juvenile justice systems, as well as on providing special
education and physical and mental health care for maltreated
children."2 Indirectly, society must contend with the consequenc-
es of abuse and neglect because maltreated children dispropor-
tionately commit crimes as juveniles; grow up to engage in adult
criminal activity; and suffer higher rates of mental illness, sub-
stance abuse, and domestic violence."2 The child welfare and ju-
venile offender populations overlap significantly. 127 In short, ne-
glect has serious costs for children, families, and society.
B. The Link Between Poverty and Child Neglect
Although many poor families do not maltreat their children,"'
poor people, and particularly poor mothers of color, are dispropor-
tionately involved with the child welfare system."9 A state's level
122. Id.
123. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010, supra note 111, at x.
124. See infra note 372 and accompanying text (discussing the harms associated with
foster care).
125. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 27. Direct public expenditures for the
child welfare system are estimated to be over $23 billion annually. See CYNTHIA ANDREWS
SCARCELLA ET AL., THE COSr OF PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN V: UNDERSTANDING
STATE VARIATION IN CHILD WELFARE FINANCING 6 (2006), available at http:I/www.urban.
org/UploadedPDF/311314_vulnerablechildrenpdf.
126. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 27.
127. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 53, 70-71 (2012).
128. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 31.
129. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE vi, 8
(2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: In-
suring that Poor Families Remain Intact by Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of
Poverty, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 607, 615 (2000); Kristen Shook Slack et al., Understanding the
Risks of Child Neglect: An Exploration of Poverty and Parenting Characteristics, 9 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 395, 396-97 (2004) (noting it has long been known that children from
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of child well-being is statistically related to its poverty rate. 130 Ne-
glect in particular is more directly associated with poverty than
other types of child maltreatment.13 Recent studies show that the
children of unemployed parents experience two to three times
higher rates of neglect than children of employed parents.'32
Moreover, children from very low-income families, that is, fami-
lies either with incomes of less than $15,000 a year or receiving
public benefits, are seven times more likely to be neglected than
children from other families.33 Homelessness and receipt of public
benefits such as welfare and Medicaid are also strongly associat-
ed with involvement in the child welfare system.
3 4
Researchers are working to understand the relationship be-
tween poverty and neglect, although the complexity of the varia-
bles makes it difficult to isolate cause and effect.'35 As a result, re-
searchers focus on risk factors within families that heighten the
likelihood of neglect.'36 One explanation for the link between pov-
erty and neglect is that poor families are more involved with state
agencies and thus more likely to be identified.137 As a condition of
poor families are overrepresented in the CPS); Roberts, supra note 114, at 163-64.
130. See CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 29; Christina Paxson & Jane Wald-
fogel, Work, Welfare, and Child Maltreatment, 20 J. OF LAB. ECON. 435, 460 (2002) ("About
half of families referred to CPS are receiving welfare at the time of the referral, and more
than half have received welfare in the past.").
131. See CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 29.
132. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report.congressiull-pdfjan2OlO.pdf. Data was derived
from investigated cases reported by child protective services, as well as other community
professionals who work with children and families. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 12.
134. See Huntington, supra note 109, at 668-69. At the same time, receipt of WIC food
support and food stamps lowered the risk of substantiated CAN reports, probably because
they enhance economic security. See Bong Joo Lee et al., Effects of WIC and Food Stamp
Participation on Child Outcomes, USDA ERS REP. 27, 34-35 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://digitalcorpora.org/corp/nps/files/govdocs 1/014/014721.pdf.
135. Maria Cancian et al., The Effect of Family Income on Risk of Child Maltreatment,
Discussion Paper 1385-10 Inst. For Research on Poverty 1 (2010), http://www.irp.wisc.
edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp138510.pdf.
136. See JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR
PRACTICE 27-34 (2003), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/found
ation/foundatione.cfm.
137. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 129, at 168-71; Diana Baumrind,
The Social Context of Child Maltreatment, 43 FAM. REL. 360, 360 (1994); Daan Braveman
& Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for Poverty
Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 461-62 (1997).
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receiving public benefits, poor families are subject to intense
scrutiny by the state, ranging from home visits to elaborate veri-
fication requirements to drug testing.' 8 In addition, there is un-
derreporting of maltreatment in middle- and upper-income
households, where mandatory reporters are more likely to con-
clude that child injuries are accidental rather than intentional.'39
Yet these class biases are not the entire explanation; rather, liv-
ing in a poor household appears to raise the risks of neglect 4-
although, as this article explains, many findings of "neglect" are
really findings of poverty. 14'
Studies suggest five main reasons for why poverty is correlated
with neglect. First, and most obvious, a lack of economic re-
sources can result in conditions-such as hunger, inadequate
housing, and homelessness-which are harmful to children.'42 No-
tably, the working poor struggle to maintain jobs despite obsta-
cles that can include irregular hours as well as a lack of transpor-
tation, child care, living wage, or health insurance.4 In turn,
these obstacles can result in neglect, particularly when children
are left alone in the home.' Poor families also live in more dan-
gerous housing structures and neighborhoods, making the rate of
accidental deaths far higher than for middle-class children. 4'
Second, poverty causes stress, which in turn, can make it hard
to parent effectively. "The stress of living in harsh, deprived con-
ditions can have a disabling effect on parenting capacities, result-
138. See Gilman, supra note 17, at 1391.
139. See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 137, at 462 & n.118.
140. See Baumrind, supra note 137, at 360-61; Leroy H. Pelton, The Role of Material
Factors in Child Abuse and Neglect, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT
132-33 (Gary B. Melton & Frank D. Barry eds., 1994).
141. See Laura Frame, Parent-Child Relationships in Conditions of Urban Poverty:
Protection, Care, and Neglect of Infants and Toddlers, Policy Brief, Center for Soc. Servs.
Research 3-4 (Sept. 2001), http://cssr.berkeley.edulchildwelfare/pdfs/parent child.pdf
142. See Mabry, supra note 129, at 616; Cancian et al., supra note 135, at 3.
143. See, e.g., Mabry, supra note 129, at 616; Patricia A. Shin, Work and Family: Poli-
cies for the Working Poor, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 349-51 (1989).
144. See Mabry, supra note 129, at 611-12. There appears to be an association between
a family's ability to purchase child care, as a result of workforce attachment, and lower
rates of maltreatment. See Mark E. Courtney, Steven L. McMurtry & Andrew Zinn, Hous-
ing Problems Experienced by Recipients of Child Welfare Services, 83 CHILD WELFARE 393,
393-94 (2004); Cancian et al., supra note 135, at 1304.
145. LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 146 (1989). Poor families face hazards
such as increased rates of fires, broken stairs, frayed electrical wiring, lack of heat, ro-
dents, lead paint, and unsecured windows. Id. at 145-49.
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ing in inconsistent discipline, failure to respond to a child's emo-
tional needs, or failure to prevent or address a potential risk to
safety. ' 146 Third, poverty compounds the vulnerability of low-
income parents and is related to increased levels of drug and al-
cohol abuse, as well as mental and physical illness. '47 In turn,
these disabling conditions can lead to neglect. 4 ' Fourth, poor par-
ents are more likely to be isolated from support networks, such as
relatives, neighbors, and religious and community groups.'49 This
isolation compounds the lack of economic resources, stress, and
vulnerability of poor parents."' Fifth, there is an intergeneration-
al component to child neglect. "Parents who neglect often come
from neglecting families; their parenting styles are learned be-
haviors, and they themselves might not have the capabilities to
do much better than they are doing."15' Overlaying all these fac-
tors is the reality that poor parents lack the buffer that financial
resources provide. For instance, there are middle-class parents
who abuse drugs and alcohol and suffer from depression, but they
have the economic wherewithal to seek professional help and to
pay for child care to replace their own supervision."2 In sum, pov-
erty is connected to neglect through a variety of mechanisms that
both create and reinforce parenting challenges. The poverty de-
fense alone does not remove these challenges; at most, it places
them into a broader context.
C. Child Neglect Proceedings
Civil cases involving child maltreatment are often called de-
pendency cases and, depending on the state, are heard in family
146. Joy Duva & Sania Metzger, Addressing Poverty as a Major Risk Factor in Child
Neglect: Promising Policy and Practice, 25 PROTECTING CHILD. 63, 65 (2010); see also
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 129, at 164-65; Baumrind, supra note 137, at
361; Pelton, supra note 140, at 151-53.
147. Duva & Metzger, supra note 146, at 66.
148. See GOLDMAN ETAL., supra note 136, at 28-29, 33.
149. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 32.
150. See id.; Baumrind, supra note 137, at 361-62.
151. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 118, at 570 (arguing that child welfare system
needs to provide services to children and not just parents because effects of neglect on
children can be devastating to healthy brain development); see also Clare Huntington, Mu-
tual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 1490 (2007) ("[The sys-
tem is self-perpetuating. Research has begun to show the intergenerational cycle of foster
care.").
152. Courtney et al., supra note 144, at 66.
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or juvenile court.'53 The goal of the civil child welfare system is
protection of children.5 4 Accordingly, when allegations of neglect
are substantiated, the child welfare system will often respond to
neglect by removing children from their parents, placing them in
foster care, requiring the parents to comply with a case plan to
lessen the risk of future maltreatment, and then determining
what to do with the children long-term.' If the parents are una-
ble to comply with their case plan, and if the children have been
in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months, the state will
move for termination of parental rights.5 6 Termination of paren-
tal rights permanently severs the legal relationship between par-
ent and child, and if the rights of both parents are terminated,
the child may be considered available for adoption.'5 7 Before ter-
minating parental rights, courts must find, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the parent is unfit and that severing the par-
ent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. ' This
heightened standard of proof is imposed because parents have a
fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their
children."9 This right is not absolute; the state also has a parens
patriae interest in protecting children.' Reflecting on this pro-
153. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD WELFARE AND THE COURTS (2011) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
CHILD WELFARE], available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cwandcourts.
pdf; see also JAN MCCARTHY ET AL., A FAMILY'S GUIDE TO THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 47-
52 (2003), available at http://www.cwla.org/childwelfare/fg.pdf; Annette R. Appell, Protect-
ing Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection Sys-
tem, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 582 (1997).
154. McCARTHY ETAL., supra note 153, at 12.
155. See Huntington, supra note 151, at 1490; Jessica E. Marcus, The Neglectful
Parens Patriae: Using Child Protective Laws to Defend the Safety Net, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 255, 257 (2006).
156. UNDERSTANDING CHILD WELFARE, supra note 153, at 3-4. State processes can
vary from this general framework, and they also have different terms for these various
phases. Id. at 4. There are some exceptions to this mandate. See id. Parents can also con-
sent to voluntary termination of parental rights. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS], available at http://
childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/groundtermin.pf.
157. UNDERSTANDING CHILD WELFARE, supra note 153, at 4.
158. See TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 156, at 2.
159. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-45 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
160. See generally Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare
System's Disregard for the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L.
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cess, one state supreme court justice described what he saw as
the depressing sameness of child neglect cases that he saw:
The pattern is familiar: Hungry children, dirty children, unkempt
children, and improperly attended children come to the attention of
welfare officials. The children are, without the parents' having the
benefit of legal counsel, "temporarily" removed from their homes.
The poor parents are forced into submitting to some kind of "plan"
devised by welfare officials. Frequently, the poverty-stricken parents
are not able to cope with the State's demands; and legal proceedings
are instituted to deprive the poor parents of their children perma-
nently, and more importantly, to deprive the poor children of their
parents. 161
This is the civil framework within which the poverty defense
operates.
Child neglect can also be prosecuted criminally.162 As with civil
statutes, states vary in how they define criminal neglect, which is
often called child endangerment in the criminal context. 3 Juris-
dictions also vary in how vigorously they pursue criminal neglect
charges. In New York City, for instance, prosecutors aggressively
seek criminal protective orders against parents suspected of ne-
glect and charge parents with criminal neglect. 4 Other jurisdic-
tions prefer to leave neglect cases within the juvenile or family
courts to avoid further traumatizing children or interfering with
rehabilitative efforts. 5 The goals of criminal proceedings are os-
REV. 55, 59-64 (2009) (discussing common law development of the parens patriae doc-
trine).
161. Kidwell v. Dep't of Human Res., Div. of Child & Family Servs., 953 P.2d 1, 10-11
(Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., dissenting).
162. The stages in this process are the same as other criminal proceedings, typically
arrest and bail (or conditions of release), preliminary hearings, discovery, plea bargaining,
and trial. See WILLIAM G. JONES, OFFICE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, WORKING WITH THE
COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 41-43 (2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/
pubs/usermanuals/courts/courts.pdf. Child neglect can also be prosecuted under criminal
statutes of general applicability, such as assault statutes. See Roberts, supra note 11, at
161.
163. See Eric C. Shedlosky, Comment, Protecting Children from the Harmful Behavior
of Adults, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 321-22 (2007) ("The various statutory ap-
proaches also differ according to the potential harm to a minor required to establish a vio-
lation and the degree of punishment dispensed to offenders.").
164. See Jaros, supra note 108, at 1460-61. 'The last two decades have witnessed an
astonishing increase in the use of the criminal justice system to police neglectful parents."
Id. at 1447. Jaros explains that this increase is due to the recasting of home as a public
space through domestic violence cases, criminal law's propensity to expand into new sub-
stantive areas of law, and the broken windows approach to crime prevention and highly
publicized failures of the civil child welfare system. Id. at 1461-62.
165. JONES, supra note 162, at 41. Tragic cases of child neglect that result in death,
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tensibly punishment and deterrence, while the goals of the child
welfare system are protection of children and treatment for par-
ents.166 However, this distinction may be overstated in the realm
of child neglect. As Professor Douglas Besharov points out, "A
criminal prosecution can provide important rehabilitative ser-
vices. Conversely, a civil child protection proceeding, which can
involve the child's forced removal from the parents' custody and
the parents' involuntary treatment, has indisputably punitive as-
pects." ' Moreover, for some parents, the civil penalty of termina-
tion of parental rights is worse than the criminal penalty of in-
carceration. In short, whether a neglect case is civil, criminal, or
both is largely a matter of jurisdictional preferences. Regardless,
the sanctions for parents under each regime can be severe.
D. The Poverty Defense
In 1915, at the height of the family preservation movement, a
Massachusetts court was faced with deciding whether a mother
should lose her three-year-old son because she was a pauper.163
Unable to find work, the mother sought relief from the local over-
seer of the poor, who placed her and her children in the alms-
house.'6 9 This apparently led the state to claim that the child was
neglected because his mother could not support him on her own. 7 '
This was not an unusual situation. Poor, single mothers faced an
especially high risk of involuntary child removal at this time be-
such as children accidentally left alone in locked cars, are often, but not always, criminally
prosecuted. See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecut-
ing Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (2006). Poor parents are prosecuted
in negligent homicide cases at higher rates than middle and upper income parents. id. at
811 (arguing that parents who commit involuntary manslaughter should be prosecuted as
prosecution serves deterrent and expressive effects). Her empirical study of cases of chil-
dren dying of hypothermia as a result of being left unattended in a parent's care found
that middle or upper class parents were prosecuted at a rate of 23.3%, while parents with
lower socioeconomic status had prosecution rates of 85.7%. Id. at 831-32. "A multiple re-
gression analysis confirmed that socioeconomic status was an independently significant
factor in prosecutorial decision making." Id. at 832.
166. Meghan Scahill, Prosecuting Attorneys in Dependency Proceedings in Juvenile
Court: Defining and Assessing a Critical Role in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1 J.
CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 73, 77 (1999).
167. Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315, 318 (1986).
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cause they were deemed immoral. 17' The court rejected the state's
argument. '72 The court reasoned that "the Legislature used the
word [neglect] in the sense which imports some kind of culpability
in the conduct of, or at least an intentional nonperformance of du-
ty by, the parent from whose custody the child is to be taken.'7 3
In this case, the mother was merely poor, but not undesirable or
unfit.'74 Thus, the court linked neglect-but not poverty-with pa-
rental culpability.'' As the court commented, "a grave injustice
would be done to such innocent victims of poverty by bringing
them into court with its stigma of criminality."'76 Parental culpa-
bility remains a factor in child neglect case law. For the Massa-
chusetts court, at least, poverty and culpability were not co-
extensive."'
This reasoning appears to underlie the poverty defense con-
tained in the statutes of at least twenty-five states," as well as
the District of Columbia, which consider economic hardship at
some stage of dependency cases. 79 In many of these states, the
definition of neglect that triggers removal excludes a failure to
provide for a child's needs that is caused by financial hardship. As
171. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 168-69 (1988).
172. Dee, 110 N.E. at 288.
173. Id. "As early as 1887, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children stated.., that 'we never take neglected children by law from their parents,
where then neglect arises from honest poverty alone."' Pelton, supra note 145, at 4.
174. Dee, 110 N.E. at 287.
175. See id. at 288.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Legislative history of these provisions is lacking; as one court stated: "Clear an-
swers to the [interpretation of the poverty defense] are not to be found, so far as we are
aware, in the legislative history of the law or past opinions of this court." In re A.H. 842
A.2d 674, 687 (D.C. Ct. App. 2004).
179. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.014 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(13)(A) (Supp.
2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120(6) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(18)
(Cum. Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.01(32)(f) (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 232.68(2)(4)(a) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(t)
(2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(f) (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2012); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 603(16) (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(b)(2) (West 2012); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(21)(a)(4) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(3) (2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX) (Cum. Supp. 2012); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a) (2012);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-a) (Consol. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2011);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(8) (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303(b)(2) (West 2010);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(1)(iv) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(4)(c) (2010); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.001(4)(b)(iii) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(14) (West
2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-3(11) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
48.02(12g) (West 2011); 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2012).
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an example, the District of Columbia defines a neglected child as
one who does not experience "proper parental care or control,
subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or con-
trol necessary for his.., health, and the deprivation is not due to
the lack of financial means of' the parent or custodian. 80 Alterna-
tively, some states recognize the poverty defense as a matter of
common law. For instance, the Georgia courts have stated that
"[w]hile the state may not sit blindly idle as a child suffers uncon-
scionable hardship, neither may it blithely intercede simply be-
cause the child's lot is substandard."181
Other state statutes excuse poverty-related child neglect only
after considering whether the state has offered services to poor
parents and how the parents have responded. 2 Florida's statue is
an example of this approach, providing that it "shall not be con-
sidered neglect if [failure to provide for the child is] caused pri-
marily by financial inability unless actual services for relief have
been offered to and rejected [by the parent]."'"3 The National Child
Abuse and Neglect Data System, a federally funded national data
collection effort, similarly defines neglect as "the failure by the
caregiver to provide needed, age-appropriate care although finan-
cially able to do so or offered financial or other means to do so.""8 4
These statutes oblige both the state and parents to improve a
180. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
181. R.C.N. v. Georgia, 233 S.E.2d 866, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); cf. In re J.E., 711
S.E.2d 5, 15-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (Dillard, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
terminating parental rights on the basis of the mother's poverty).
182. The Model Juvenile Court Act and federal law also exclude poverty from neglect.
See UNIF. MODEL JUVENILE CT. ACT § 47 (1968); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d) (1990).
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(44) (West 2012); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
303(36)(A)(ii) (2011) ("and no services for relief have been offered"); IOWA CODE § 232.68
(2011) ("or when offered financial or other reasonable means to do so"); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-102(21)(a)(iv) (2009) ("or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so"); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.21 (2002) ("or though offered financial or other reasonable means to do
so"); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-a)(i)(A) (Consol. 2011) ("or offered financial or other rea-
sonable means to do so"); R.I. GEN, LAWS § 40-11-2(1)(iv) (2006) ("or offered financial or
other reasonable means to do so"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(4)(c) (1976) ("or offered finan-
cial or other reasonable means to do so"); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 261.001(40(B)(iii) (West
2011) ("unless relief services had been offered and refused").
184. See PETER J. PECORA ET AL., THE CHILD WELFARE CHALLENGE 126 (2010).
NCANDS notes that reporting is impacted by state definitions: "When conducting anal-
yses with NCANDS data, it is important to keep in mind that state-to-state variation in
child maltreatment laws and information systems may affect the interpretation of the da-
ta." See NAT'L CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT DATA SYS., http://aspe.hhs.govfhsp/O6/catalog-ai-
an-naINCANDS.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
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family's economic situation before parental rights are terminat-
ed.185
At least four states do not consider poverty in their definitions
of neglect, but they do exclude poverty as a ground for termina-
tion of parental rights.8 6 This means that children can be re-
moved from their homes for poverty-related neglect, but the par-
ents' rights cannot subsequently be terminated on this basis.
Kentucky is an example of this approach; there, it is grounds for
termination if "the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone,
has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of
providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or educa-
tion reasonably necessary and available for the child's well-
being."'8 7 The poverty defense is less common in the criminal con-
text; it is recognized in seven states, including New York. 18  In
short, about half the states recognize a poverty defense in civil
proceedings, while a handful permit the defense in criminal cas-
189es.
It should be noted that in both the civil and criminal contexts,
the "poverty defense" is not technically a separate defense. Be-
cause it is part of the definition of child neglect, a parent arguing
185. A related poverty defense arises in child support contempt cases; this is not sur-
prising as failure to pay child support is a form of economic neglect. See Elizabeth G. Pat-
terson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debt-
or's Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 125-26 (2008) (discussing the "defense of
inability to pay"). When parents fail to pay child support, they can be charged with con-
tempt; however, incarceration is not supposed to be imposed if the contemnor lacks the
ability to pay arrears. See id. at 102, 104. Yet, as Patterson explains, the reality is that
indigent parents are regularly incarcerated, due to a lack of procedural protections for liti-
gants. See id. at 116-25. In other words, the poverty defense in child support enforcement
cases is usually a failure, with dismal consequences for families and society. Id. at 126.
186. See infra note 187.
187. K.Y. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(g) (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2012). Similar stat-
utes are found in Minnesota, North Carolina, and Nebraska. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260C.301 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292
(2009).
188. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 615 (1999); D.C. CODE § 22-1102 (2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 827.03 (West 2003) (amended 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-602.1 (West
2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.42.020 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-4 (Lex-
isNexis 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.21 (West 2011).
189. There are states that affirmatively reject a poverty defense. For instance, in Vir-
ginia, courts have ruled that poverty is irrelevant to determining neglect. City of Campbell
v. Woodruff, 2004 WL 3391872, at *7 (Va. App. Oct 12, 2004). Further, in at least three
states, statutes provide that homelessness is a ground for removal, thus equating poverty
with neglect. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-102 (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 (West
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-8A-2 (2009). Ohio includes homelessness in its dependen-
cy definition. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (LexisNexis 1996).
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poverty is making a failure of proof defense, or "negation of an el-
ement required by the definition of the offense."'90 However, the
reality is that in proving child neglect, states are not required to
prove a parent's availability of financial resources as part of their
prima facie case. Instead, the parents have to raise poverty in
their own defense.' Based on available written decisions, many
parents do raise the poverty defense, sometimes successfully.
192
Nevertheless, each year, thousands of children are removed from
their parents for conditions caused by poverty. Indeed, "inade-
quacy of income, more than any factor, constitutes the reason that
children are removed."'193
III. THE POVERTY DEFENSE: THEORY IN PRACTICE
Cases that interpret the child neglect poverty defense reflect
the various theories that scholars have put forward to justify a
broad-based poverty defense for all criminal cases. Accordingly,
we can consider these theories in a real-life setting to consider
how a poverty defense might operate in other contexts. There are
sharp disagreements on the proper balance between parents'
rights and children's rights in child welfare law.194 Despite these
debates, there is near unanimity that most children who are re-
moved from their parents are poor.19' This section examines writ-
ten decisions that consider the poverty defense; most of them
arise in the civil context of termination of parental rights. ' 96 As
this section demonstrates, the poverty defense rarely succeeds
unless the court has a nuanced understanding of how poverty is
related to neglect, which in turn is sometimes influenced by a
judge's personal ideology.
190. Robinson, supra note 45, at 204.
191. See, e.g., Wright v. Florida, 409 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("[Tlhe
burden is on the parent.., to come forward with evidence that the condition was una-
voidable because of poverty.").
192. See, e.g., In re A.S.C., 671 A.2d 942, 947-48 (D.C. 1996).
193. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 129, at 35.
194. Huntington, supra note 109, at 638 (arguing against a rights based model in child
welfare).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 128-52 (discussing the connection between
poverty and neglect).
196. E.g., In re A.H., 842 A.2d 674, 686-87 (D.C. Ct. App. 2004). There are far fewer
reported criminal cases involving the poverty defense, probably because the defense is less
common in the criminal context; most criminal cases result in plea bargaining; and par-
ents may lack the resources to appeal adverse decisions.
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A. The Poverty Defense as an Excuse of Coercion
In many decisions that consider the poverty defense, courts ad-
dress the present economic circumstances of the parents, but do
not delve into the parents' personal backgrounds or psychological
histories as explanations for the alleged neglect.'97 Thus, the de-
fense most often resembles a coercion defense rather than an RSB
defense. The precise terminology of the statutory poverty defense
does not seem to make a difference in the courts' analyses. Stat-
utes containing the poverty defense use varying terms, such as
"poverty" or "lack of financial means[;]" however, the statutes do
not define these terms, and courts use them interchangeably. 98
So what does poverty mean? Poverty is a relative concept influ-
enced by time and place,'99 but it generally refers to economic
deprivation." While the official poverty line set by the federal
government measures who is poor, it does not define what it
means to be poor. According to the most recent data, the poverty
line is $23,021 for a family of four.2 1 Based on this measurement,
minorities and female-headed families are disproportionately
poor, and growing up poor is associated with higher poverty rates
as an adult.2 2 At any given time, more than half of all poor people
are in a long-term poverty spell of ten years or more.213 "While
poverty in general refers to material deprivation, it is a multi-
faceted experience with many different effects on those who are
struggling to get by." ' 4 These effects are apparent in the child ne-
glect case law, which is rife with stories of families facing difficul-
ty paying bills and affording rent, food, and clothes; living in sub-
standard housing; lacking medical care; suffering with mental
health problems; wrestling with substance abuse problems; and
197. See, e.g., id.; MP v. Wyoming ex rel. CP, 965 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 1998).
198. Compare In reA.H., 842 A.2d at 686-87 (citing D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(15) (Supp.
2000)), with V.S. v. Kentucky, 194 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (citing KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(g) (LexisNexis 1998)).
199. See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 10 (2d ed. 2006).
200. Id. at 21.
201. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS (2011), available at http://www.cen
sus.gov/hhes/wwwlpoverty/datalthreshld/index.html.
202. See ICELAND, supra note 199, at 41, 51, 68.
203. Id. at 49.
204. Id. at 144.
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living in neighborhoods with high rates of crime.0 5 Many written
opinions involve neglect caused by poverty-induced stress.2 6
When courts consider a multi-faceted view of poverty, the pov-
erty defense can be successful in keeping families intact.2 7 For in-
stance, in In re S.M. W.,20 s the state sought to terminate the pa-
rental rights of a single mother of four children, all born before
she was twenty-one.2 9 At the time of the abuse report triggering
the child welfare investigation, the mother was incarcerated for
theft, burglary, and marijuana possession, and the children were
in the care of her family members.2 0 However, the family mem-
bers soon relinquished the children to the state because they were
unable to afford their care.21' When the mother was released from
incarceration, the children remained in foster care, and the state
developed a series of case plans in order to reunify the family.2
12
These plans required the mother to support her children's foster
care placements, visit her children, complete parenting classes,
secure stable employment and adequate housing, submit to peri-
odic psychiatric evaluations and counseling, and comply with the
conditions of her probation.23 The child welfare department even-
tually decided to seek termination of the mother's parental rights,
charging that she failed to comply with the case plans.214
The appellate court rejected the state's arguments, concluding
that the mother diligently worked to comply with her case plans,
while the department offered the mother only "nebulous case
plans, vacillating goals and misdirected assistance" as well as
205. See, e.g., Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101, 1103 (Del. 2002).
206. See, e.g., id.; In re Mack, 2000 WL 681648, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 2000).
Dorothy Roberts defines neglect caused by poverty-induced stress as a "crime caused by
poverty," while financial inability to provide for children is a "crime defined by poverty."
Roberts, supra note 116, at 172. It is likely that cases involving a failure to provide are
resolved at the agency level or at an earlier stage of the process than the termination of
parental rights, and thus not reflected in appellate decisions.
207. Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging Parents, Judging Place: Poverty, Ru-
rality, and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 Mo. L. REV. 95, 142 (2012) ("Doing justice
for rural families also may require an understanding of cultural differences and of the par-
ticular spatial and social challenges these families face.").
208. 771 So. 2d 160 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
209. Id. at 163.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 164, 166.
213. Id. at 166-67.
214. Id. at 167, 169, 171-72.
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denying her support in obtaining housing or employment.1 5 The
court commented on the catch-22 facing the mother as the de-
partment imposed "antithetical requirements."" ' When the moth-
er worked multiple jobs to secure an adequate income, depart-
ment workers found her supervision of her children lacking.1 7
When she cut back on her work hours to spend more time with
her children, she had to move to a smaller home, which led the
workers to deem her living situation unstable.21 ' The court recog-
nized that in the low-wage labor market and with a dearth of af-
fordable housing, a parent's choice is between more work or less
comfortable living conditions.2 ' In its decision, the court com-
mended the mother for her persistence despite these odds and
commented bitterly, "[Wihile the Department is powerless to
mandate the sterilization of poor, uneducated single women, its
insidious plan of terminating the parental rights of these women,
largely because of their financial, educational and marital status,
compels essentially the same result.""22 The court thus viewed
child neglect as rooted in poverty, and poverty as rooted in struc-
tural causes with multi-faceted effects.22" ' The family was reunit-
ed. 222
The idea that poverty is not a crime is also occasionally reflect-
ed in criminal child neglect case law. In State v. Chavez, the court
considered whether a filthy home environment was enough to
support a child endangerment conviction."2 There, an infant child
died when she was put to sleep in a dresser drawer and apparent-
ly suffocated on the bedding in the drawer. 24 The father was
charged with child endangerment with respect to the infant and
215. Id. at 167, 169, 175.
216. Id. at 170; see also S.K. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 990 So. 2d 887, 903
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (noting that a father should not be penalized for working too hard
and that the state had put him in a catch-22 because if he were not working the state
would fault him for lack of employment stability).
217. In re S.M.W, 771 So. 2d at 169.
218. Id. at 169-70.
219. See id. at 170.
220. Id. at 168; see also Doria v. Tex. Dep't of Human Res., 747 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex.
App. 1988). In that case, the appellate court reversed a termination order, stating that the
mother had made significant improvements under her case plan, which were "difficult
milestones considering appellant's economic situation." Id.
221. See In re S.M.W., 771 So. 2d. at 170.
222. See id. at 175.




her two older brothers. " ' The evidence at trial showed that the
house was unsanitary, was filled with rodent droppings, had a
lack of gas or hot water, had piles of dirty clothes, and had glass
and rusty nails in the yard.22 At the same time, the surviving
children were physically healthy and well-nourished, and there
was no evidence of drugs or alcohol in the home.2 7 The father was
convicted of child abuse by endangerment and argued on appeal
that the home's conditions were caused by poverty and did not
endanger his children.22 The court agreed, finding that the state
failed to provide evidence of a connection between the home's
conditions and "a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm." '229 The
court noted that the family had been investigated by the New
Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department, but the civil
child welfare system had not taken any further action. ' The
court strongly suggested that the use of the civil process would be
more appropriate, as "this is a case where the family struggled
with poverty, and our ultimate goal should be to assist, rather
than to punish, that status."'' This approach severs poverty from
culpability.
By contrast, most courts in child neglect cases generally take a
narrower view of poverty, which allows them to easily find non-
economic-that is, behavioral-grounds for terminating parental
rights.2"' For instance, in Division of Youth & Family Services v.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 894.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 895.
229. Id. at 901.
230. Id. at 901-02.
231. Id. A similar analysis was made by the dissenting judge in Commonwealth v.
O'Conner which the majority upheld a first-degree criminal abuse charge against a father
who locked his children in their rooms on a hot day while he napped, the children were
found with urine soaked clothes, and a three-year old had eaten his own feces. 372 S.W.3d
855, 856-58 (Ky. 2012). The dissenting judge stated that the case should have been han-
dled as a civil action for neglect and commented that given the father's fifteen-year sen-
tence, state taxpayers may spend up to almost half a million dollars to incarcerate some-
one who is guilty only of "poor parental judgment and keeping a filthy house." Id. at 862-
63 (Scott, J., dissenting).
232. See, e.g., In re A.A.M.B., 62 So. 3d 813, 814, 816 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (terminating a
father's parental rights not because he was poor, but because he failed to comply with case
plan requirements); In re R.L.T., No. COA11-163, 2011 WL 2848793 (N.C. App. July 19,
2011) (removing children because of father's substance abuse, not due to poverty); A.L.M.
v. A.M., No. E049686, 2010 WL 2769805, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 14, 2010) (terminating
parental rights not due to poverty, but for risk of neglect) ("[P]overty placed the children at
risk for neglect and Mother showed little interest in protecting her children from that risk
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K C., New Jersey Child Protective Services removed children
from their home due to extreme filthiness. 3 The trial court found
that the house was crawling with roaches, was littered with trash
bags, smelled of urine and feces, and contained a bucket of urine
in a bedroom.3 ' Nevertheless, a medical exam revealed the chil-
dren had no major medical problems.2 6 The trial judge terminat-
ed the mother's parental rights focusing on the mother's conduct
and divorcing it from her income level.3 6 The judge stated, "[y]ou
do not have to be rich, you don't have to earn a lot of money to
keep a clean house and this was not just a dirty house. .. , [t]his
was a disgusting, deplorable, filthy, dangerous condition." '237 The
appellate court agreed with this reasoning, concluding that the
case did not hinge on poverty but rather on "an apparent indiffer-
ence to the potential harm that such filthy conditions could cre-
ate. 2 3' 8 Thus, the court linked the filthy conditions solely to paren-
tal culpability, rather than to any environmental or structural
factors linked to poverty.
From the decision, it is hard to know whether termination was
warranted in the K C. case, that is, whether it was in the chil-
dren's best interests. Nevertheless, in focusing solely on the
of neglect."); D.N. v. State, No. 49A04-0910-JV-597, 2010 WL 2020290, at *9 (Ind. Ct. App.
May 21, 2010) (finding termination not based on poverty but father's 'lack of initiative");
In re M.N.N.G., No. COA09-697, 2009 WL 3353014, at *2, *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009)
(holding that mother's rights were not terminated due to poverty, but because she turned
down housing and continued an abusive relationship); D.J. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child
Servs., No. 49A05-0803-JV-180, 2008 WL 4149822, at *8 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2008)
(removing children not for poverty but because home was unsanitary and cluttered); A-R.
v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., No. 49A02-0604-JV-360, 2007 WL 582876, at *9
(Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007) ("We agree that poverty alone does not show unfitness. That
does not mean, however, that poverty which causes a parent to neglect a child or expose
the child to danger cannot be considered by a trial court in determining whether to termi-
nate parental rights."); Michael M.S. v. Kathy S., Nos. 99-2384, 99-2385, 1999 WL
1221230, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1999) (terminating parental rights not due to pov-
erty, but due to "personal choice and responsibility"); In re R.M., 431 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Io-
wa Ct. App. 1988) ("Economic considerations were not paramount. Stability and control of
her behavior and responsibility for her children were more clearly at issue."); VS. v.
Commonwealth, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) ('This is more than just a pov-
erty case.").
233. 2006 WL 3328348 (N.J. Super. Ct, App. Div. Nov. 17, 2006).
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *3-4.
237. Id. at *3.
238. Id. at *5; see also Wisconsin v. Lynn Co., 268 Wis. 2d 847, *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)
("[C]leanliness is a matter of effort, not poverty."); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
S.A., No. A-2499-07T4, 2009 WL 77969, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 14, 2009) (find-
ing that poverty is not an excuse for a dirty home).
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mother's conduct, the trial and appellate courts failed to consider
the proven link between poor housing conditions and poverty. For
instance, it is possible that the family was using a bucket as a toi-
let because the plumbing was not working, because they could not
afford a plumber, or because a landlord refused to make needed
repairs. Moreover, the court never addressed the state's apparent
failure to provide the mother with any services, resources, or
equipment to help her clean the home, even though federal law
requires that states make "reasonable efforts" to support family
reunification,2 39 and even though cleanliness is a far cheaper fix
than many deep-rooted problems facing poor families, such as
homelessness or mental illness.24 ° Instead, the court took a nar-
row view of poverty, while assuming that the mother had a broad
range of voluntary choices in shaping her own conduct. 241' Thus,
the mother could not satisfy the poverty defense in its necessity
or duress form. 42
This approach abounds in the case law.43 Many courts focus in-
tensely on parenting deficiencies, ignoring the economic hardship
facing families in the child welfare system and lacking under-
standing of how structural inequalities impact poor families. An-
other particularly common proxy for poverty is rurality, as many
courts fail to recognize the spatial and fiscal obstacles facing ru-
ral parents.244 Other euphemisms for poverty include immaturity,
nonchalance, poor decision-making, inattentiveness, instability,
and the like. 2" The courts criticize parents who deemed seeking
239. See generally Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36
U. TOL. L. REV. 321 (2005) (assessing how courts have interpreted the reasonable efforts
requirement).
240. One dissenting judge in a termination case commented that if the mother had
been wealthier, "she could hire a cleaning service." In re N.M.W., 461 N.W.2d 478, 483
(Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (Sackett, J., dissenting). In fact, if the state had hired a cleaning ser-
vice for the family, it
would have cost the state less than the judicial time and court appointed at-
torney fees spent to litigate the adequacy of this woman's housekeeping skills
through the state's appellate courts. And most importantly, the child would
not have suffered the trauma of removal and the insecurities that come in
foster care.
Id.
241. See KC., 2006 WL 3328348, at *3-5.
242. Id. at *4-5.
243. See generally id.; Wallace & Pruitt, supra note 207, at 114.
244. See Wallace & Pruitt, supra note 207, at 99, 117.
245. See Daniels v. Dep't of Human Res., 953 P.2d 1, 10 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that courts are taking poor children for reasons of poverty but calling
poverty by other names).
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state aid "not worth the effort, 246 who "displayed no motivation to
be a parent,"'4 7 and who refused "to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities available to her for her children.
'248
Due to a range of disabling conditions, some of these parents
may be unable to parent at acceptable, safe levels no matter how
much support the state provides. Yet some of the unflattering
qualities described above stem from the stresses and realities of
living in extreme poverty while trying to meet escalating state
demands. It is difficult to know, however, because courts general-
ly do not explore the larger community, demographic, or social
context surrounding the family. As one dissenting judge stated,
"[P]arents are almost always required to submit to demeaning,
and often unproductive, 'counseling,' 'parent training,' and 'family
therapy[;]' however, the results are "almost always the same[,J
the parents remain poor; their poverty cannot be 'counseled'
away." '249 Moreover, while child prevention services often include
various forms of counseling, they rarely provide parents with ser-
vices designed to increase their economic well-being.250 In other
words, parents are typically ordered not to be poor, that is, to ob-
tain a job and housing, but they receive inadequate assistance to
meet that goal.
B. The Poverty Defense as RSB
In child neglect cases in which courts examine the parents' im-
poverished backgrounds as part of the analysis, the poverty de-
fense resembles an RSB defense. An RSB-style defense has been
successful when courts view intergenerational poverty as the
primary barrier facing the family. For instance, in In re A.L.B.,
246. In re M.B., 288 N.W. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. 1980).
247. In re C.L.B., No. C5-88-1016, 1989 WL 460, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 10, 1989).
248. In re Bell, 421 S.E.2d 590, 592 (N.C. Ct. App.). The dissenting judge in the case
found no evidence of neglect, and even the attorney for the child welfare agency conceded
at the hearing, "we would certainly admit that this is not one of the worse neglect cases
that we have ever brought, it is a marginal case-its [sic] a case where the mother has
worked with Social Services to some extent to try [to] improve conditions in the home." Id.
at 594 (Hendrick, C.J., dissenting).
249. Daniels, 953 P.2d at 12.
250. See Mary Keegan Eamon & Sandra Kopels, 'For Reasons of Poverty: Court Chal-
lenges to Child Welfare Practices and Mandated Programs, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS.
REV. 821, 823 (2004).




the state removed three children from their home due to "the ex-
treme poverty of the family, very little food in the house, dog feces
on the floors, and general filth and clutter everywhere."2 52 While
the children were in foster care, the parents struggled to obtain
stable housing; they moved from an apartment to public housing,
were evicted, lived with their preacher, rented a house, and
moved in with family members.253 In light of the filth and unsta-
ble living conditions, the trial judge terminated parental rights.2
The appellate court reversed, concluding, "We are dealing with
an unbelievably poor family with two generations of unsanitary
and messy living habits.""2 5 Despite this RSB, the appellate court
found that the parents were making slow, but steady, improve-
ments in cleaning up the home and obtaining employment. The
court reflected, "In preparing this opinion, the Court has read
through many termination cases, and we are struck by the ab-
sence of any other factors besides the poverty of the family and
poor living conditions in the home."5 ' By contrast,
In most cases we also see prevalent physical or sexual abuse, drug
and alcohol abuse, severe neglect and unconcern for the children's
welfare, lack of medical care, lack of supervision, extreme physical
and emotional delays in development of the children, mental illness
of the parent, prostitution, severe mental incapacity of parent, crim-
inal activity, incarceration, or other equally egregious factor[s]. 258
This case was about extreme poverty in a family that had known
no other way of life. Thus, the parents' RSB was a frame by which
to better understand the family.
Yet in most RSB cases, courts are willing to view RSB as an
explanation, but not as an excuse, for many of the same reasons
identified by RSB defense opponents-namely, the practical and
conceptual difficulties of excusing harmful conduct, especially
when poverty is entangled with a variety of other disabilities. In
these cases, the risk to children is simply too great. In In re A. H.,
the children were removed from their home in a public housing
project in the District of Columbia due to filth, including feces on
252. Id.
253. Id. at *2.
254. Id. at* 1.
255. Id. at *12.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *14.
258. Id.
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the floor and roaches crawling over open food left on the counters,
as well as an oven turned on with the door open and a bathtub
used as a toilet.259 According to testimony at the trial, the mother
seemed desensitized to these surroundings and apathetic to her
social worker.260 The mother lacked a high school degree, had not
worked since high school, and lived on welfare. 61
At trial, the social workers testified that the children "did not
appear sick or malnourished; they had the required immuniza-
tions; they had clothing to wear; and the two children of school
age were attending school.""26 Moreover, the trial judge found that
the District of Columbia was responsible for some of the atrocious
conditions in the home by failing to repair them. '63 However, the
judge found that the mother also bore responsibility for allowing
her children to live in such conditions, and he was "both troubled
and perplexed by the 'strange nonchalance' that [the mother] dis-
played when confronted about the unsafe and unsanitary envi-
ronment in the home."2 ' The trial judge concluded that the moth-
er could have resolved the problems in the household despite her
limited financial means."'
On appeal, the court affirmed." The appellate court noted that
"we cannot ignore or minimize the extent to which D.H.'s poverty
and forces beyond her control helped create the circumstances in
which she and her children lived. 2 Yet the court was troubled
that the poverty defense could subject the children to a risk of
harm, stating that the poverty defense "has proved to be nettle-
some in both theory and practice," because of the tension between
the defense and the statute's remedial purposes.6 The court
forthrightly expressed its concerns by asking the following: "If a
child is deprived of parental care 'necessary' for his physical
health-for example, if the child is malnourished, not properly
clothed, or denied medical care-why should the reason for the
259. 842 A.2d 674, 677-80 (D.C. 2004).
260. Id. at 680.
261. Id. at 681.
262. Id. at 680 n.9.
263. Id. at 681.
264. Id. at 682.
265. Id. at 683.
266. Id. at 690.
267. Id. at 684.
268. Id. at 686-87.
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deprivation matter in deciding whether the state should be al-
lowed to intervene and protect the child? '269 Similarly, RSB oppo-
nents charge that such a defense in criminal cases ignores the
rights of the victims, most of whom share similarly deprived
backgrounds.270
For the D.C. court, "it should be enough if the evidence shows
that parental poverty was not the only or the 'but for' cause."27'
Reviewing the evidence, the appellate court concluded that the
conditions in the home were not due to a lack of money.272 Instead,
it is clear to us that the judge could find that D.H.'s long-term fail-
ures to exert herself to keep feces off the floor, to dispose of rotten
food and other trash, to clean the kitchen, and to complain and de-
mand that maintenance and repairs and exterminations be per-
formed properly were not caused by D.H's lack of money.
27
3
Thus, as is common in child neglect cases, poverty-even with-
in an RSB context-was narrowed to income. For this court at
least, the poverty defense could result in harm to children, a re-
sult the court was unwilling to countenance.
Nevertheless, as another commentator has noted, it is possible
that this family could have been reunited if the mother had been
provided greater services, particularly mental health services, es-
pecially since the children in the case were not suffering any
harm.274 Moreover, the court fails to acknowledge that two months
after the children were removed, the District of Columbia accept-
ed more than $30 million from the federal government to demol-
ish the public housing complex where the family lived, with the
mayor stating that "[t]he homes here ... represent the largest
269. Id. at 687.
270. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 4, at 158.
271. In re A.H., 842 A.2d at 688.
272. Id. at 689.
273. Id.
274. Jesse Lubin, Note, Are We Really Looking Out for the Best Interests of the Child?
Applying the New Zealand Model of Family Group Conferences to Cases of Child Neglect in
the United States, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 129, 138 (2009) ("mhe mothers could have been
paired with service providers who could have helped with possible job training, better
housing, proper medical services for the children, and anything else the mothers would
need to quickly get their children back and into a safe home.").
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and last of our severely distressed housing."2"' Nevertheless, D.H.
lost her children largely due to the conditions of her home. 76
An RSB-style poverty defense is also challenging because the
worse the RSB, the less likely it seems the parents can overcome
their difficult backgrounds. For example, in In re A.G., the court
described the parents' wrenching personal histories rooted in
poverty."' The father had been orphaned at six months and lived
in fifty-two foster homes, some of which were abusive.278 After at-
tacking a fellow student at age fifteen, he was institutionalized;
then, upon returning from military service in Vietnam, he strug-
gled with substance abuse. 79 For her part, the mother had been
repeatedly sexually abused as a child by a male cousin over a ten-
year period, experienced blackouts and delusions, and was unable
to hold a job for more than a month.28 The mother initially turned
her newborn child over to foster care.28' While the child was in
foster care, the parents' housing was unstable; however, the par-
ents attended parenting classes, improved their visitation regu-
larity, and submitted to psychological testing, which showed them
to have a variety of mental health problems.2 Although the trial
court found that the parents were making slow improvements
pursuant to the social services case plan, the improvements were
not enough to permit unsupervised visitation, let alone reunifica-
tion of the family.8 The appellate court commented that, while
poverty and mental illness alone are not grounds for terminating
the rights of parents, if they render a parent unable to perform as
a parent, then termination is warranted. 84
275. Robert E. Pierre, Pr. George's Says it Pays Price for D.C. HUD Project, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 2000, at B2.
276. In re A.H., 842 A.2d at 690.






283. Id. at *5, *8. Many commentators have criticized the short timelines within AFSA
for a permanency decision. See Richard P. Barth et al., From Anticipation to Evidence: Re-
search on the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 371, 377 (2005);
Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a Hard-Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1977 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 375, 388-89 (2002).
284. In reA.G., 1998 WL 202779, at *4.
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In this case, the RSB was simply too great. In criminal cases,
commentators have noted that RSB not only does not excuse
crimes, but rather, it usually increases punishment.285 Likewise,
an RSB-style poverty defense in child neglect cases seems to
worsen the odds for family reunification. While states are obliged
to use reasonable efforts to reunify families, parenting support
programs face limited funding and courts thus usually interpret
the reasonable efforts requirement to mean "available services.""28
To a court, a case that presents evidence of an RSB probably
looks even more expensive and less likely to succeed than other
cases. Moreover, hanging over every juvenile judge's head is the
fear that she will reunite a family with disastrous and media-
publicized results.8 A parent with an RSB can only enhance this
fear. Accordingly, an RSB defense is as difficult in practice as its
critics predict. While RSB helps explain the challenges facing
some low-income parents, courts are usually reluctant to let it
serve as a defense.
C. The Poverty Defense as Social Forfeit
The concept of social forfeit also emerges in child neglect cases
involving the poverty defense and holds the most promise not on-
ly for families, but also for an expanded poverty defense. Social
forfeit norms are enshrined in at least nine state statutes, which
excuse child neglect caused by poverty, unless the parents have
been offered and refused state services.8 8 This type of definition
imposes rights and responsibilities on both parents and the state
and thus requires courts to examine the actions of both entities.
285. See Delgado, Wretched of the Earth, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that courts not only
have not recognized RSB, they sometimes enhance punishment based on RSB); cf. Robin-
son, supra note 68, at 61-62 (arguing that the stronger the RSB, the stronger the case for
preventative detention).
286. See Bean, supra note 239, at 365.
287. See Matthew L Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the
Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 41 (2010) (explaining how the media's
master narratives about child welfare that focus on monstrous and deviant parents make
judges fearful of leaving children with their families).
288. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 949 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (overturning adjudication of dependency based on father's financial inability to
provide for his children) ("[Tlhe evidence at bar does not disclose any offer of services
which were rejected by the father"); Brown v. Feaver, 726 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) ("Homelessness, derived solely from a custodian's financial inability, does not
constitute abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the Department offers services to the
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As discussed earlier, social forfeit theory holds that society cannot
condemn a person that society has failed to support.290 In the child
neglect context, it means that the state cannot strip a poor parent
of her rights without first offering some material aid or services;
at the same time, the parent must be amenable to assistance and
use such aid appropriately."' Under this theory, the child neglect
defense arises when both the state and the parent have failed to
meet their mutual responsibilities. Professor Clare Huntington
has described the parent-state relationship as one of mutual de-
pendency. Poor parents need support from the state, while the
state needs supportive parents due to its "interest in ensuring a
child develops into a citizen capable of participating in a delibera-
tive democracy, or, more basically, as an interest in the child
growing up to be an adult who requires minimal state spend-




The concept of social forfeit arises even when state neglect
statutes do not directly impose duties on the state to provide, and
the parents to accept, services. This is because the federal law
that provides foster care funding requires state agencies to
demonstrate that they have made reasonable efforts to provide
assistance and services to preserve and reunify families.2 93 Both
Congress and the state legislatures, however, failed to further de-
fine "reasonable efforts." '94 Moreover, courts are generally tenta-
tive in interpreting the reasonable efforts requirement, in part
because states can lose federal foster care funding if the require-
ment is not met.
295
homeless custodian and those services are rejected.").
290. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56.
291. Id.
292. Huntington, supra note 151, at 1486-87.
293. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) (2006).
294. In turn, state statutes generally define reasonable efforts to require child welfare
agencies to provide accessible, available, and culturally appropriate services designed to
improve the capacity of parents to provide safe and stable homes for their children. See
CHILDREN'S BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE AND REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN: SUMMARY OF
STATE LAWS (2009), available at http:t/www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies
/statutes/reunifyall.pdf (providing a survey of state law definitions of "reasonable efforts.);
see also Bean, supra note 239 at 329-31 (describing state differences).
295. Bean, supra note 239, at 333-34. "[C]ourts are fairly resolute that agencies need
not do everything conceivable or be perfect in practice." Id. at 358; see Deborah Paruch,
The Orphaning of Underprivileged Children: America's Failed Child Welfare Law and Pol-
icy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119, 138-39 (2006) (noting that funding for reasonable efforts to
reunify and preserve families is "subject to the arrival appropriation process" and can be
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Nevertheless, there are still cases in which courts impose a
strong view of social forfeit, and thus this theory is worth explor-
ing. For instance, in In re S.M. W. discussed above, the court went
to great lengths to highlight the efforts and the resilience of the
mother in the face of inconsistent case plans and a lack of ser-
vices by the state."' Another example is New Jersey Division of
Youth & Family Services v. S.R., which involved a single mother
in her early twenties without a high school degree and who lived
on welfare.297 Her newborn baby needed a heart transplant, and
the doctors became convinced that the mother did not have the
wherewithal to maintain the baby's post-operative care routine." 8
The mother could not afford transportation between her home in
New Jersey and the hospital in New York, and the Division of
Youth and Family Services provided her with only a portion of
the transportation costs. 299 Due to the mother's lack of regular
hospital visits, the Division removed the baby and placed her
with a foster mother.300
In approving a permanency plan to terminate the mother's pa-
rental rights, the trial judge wrestled with the poverty defense,
stating, 'With regard to [defendant's] financial situation, on the
one hand, one might say, well, you shouldn't hold that against
her. Well, what is the paramount importance? The safety of the
child."3 1 The judge went on to criticize the mother's failures to
overcome her poverty, asking, "[Wihat have you done to improve
[your financial circumstances]? It's no different [now then [sic] it
was before] and you are perilously close to be[ing] evicted, and
not even being able to get a cab ride, to Fed. Ex. back a Halter
monitor, with dire consequences for the child.""3 2 Thus, the trial
inadequate while foster care funds remain uncapped under Title TV-E of the Social Securi-
ty Act); see also Zuzana Murarova & Elizabeth Thornton, Federal Funding for Child Wel-
fare: What You Should Know, 29 CHILD L. PRAC. 33, 39 (2010) ("[S]tates receive federal
funding to support foster care placements, but receive little money to provide services to
keep children out of foster care or safely reunify their families after a removal to foster
care. Thus, placing children in foster care costs states less than providing services to pre-
vent state placements or maintain families.").
296. State ex rel. S.M.W., 771 So. 2d 160, 169-70 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
297. 2011 WL 1045131, *1-2 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2011).
298. Id. at *1.
299. Id. at *2, *4.
300. Id. at *1, *3.
301. Id. at *11 n.12 (alteration in original).
302. Id. (alterations in original).
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judge concluded that the foster home was a better setting for the
child than the mother's home.0 3
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court im-
properly censured the mother for being poor, while failing to ex-
amine the actions of the Division.3 4 The court stated that "the ev-
idence supported the judge's conclusion that defendant's efforts
left much to be desired, but the efforts of the Division in this diffi-
cult situation were hardly reasonable." ' 5 For example, the Divi-
sion did little more than provide the mother with part of her train
fare, provided bus fare only pursuant to a court order, and re-
quired the mother to "get the money" for the subway leg of her
journey and seek reimbursement later.06 "Considering defend-
ant's extreme impoverished state-exacerbated by the loss of [So-
cial Security disability] income with the removal of [the baby]
from her care and repeated eviction proceedings-the Division's 'ef-
forts' were hardly reasonable.""3 7 The division expected extraordi-
nary efforts on the part of the mother, but "evinced a studied in-
difference to its own obligations."0 In short, "[t]he Division
should have done more; in expecting defendant to move moun-
tains, it only handed her a shovel."3 9
According to the appellate court, the Division early on pre-
ferred the foster mother and "provided only the barest of efforts
in making it appear that it had assisted defendant, while essen-
tially ordaining defendant's failure.""31 Whereas the mother
struggled to visit her daughter in the hospital on $322 in monthly
welfare benefits, the foster mother was paid $1100 a month to
care for the child and thus could quit her job." If the mother had
gotten these foster care funds, she would likely have been able to
comply with the case plan. Thus, comparing their situations was
unfair, "otherwise, as has been recognized, such determinations
would result in 'mass transfers of children from ghettos and dis-
303. Id, at *11.
304. Id. at*10, *11 & n.12.
305. Id, at *9.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *10.
309. Id.




advantaged areas into more luxurious living accommodations but
with resultant destruction of the natural parental bond.'
312
While this opinion presents a strong view of social forfeit, it is
important to note that the caseworkers and the trial judges hear-
ing the case below did not share this view. Every parental victory
on appeal pulls back the curtain on the challenges facing poor
families as they move through the child welfare system and, of
course, only a small number of those parents have the resources
and wherewithal to press their cases on appeal.313 Nevertheless,
cases such as S.R. reflect a robust vision of mutual rights and re-
sponsibilities between the state and parents. In this vision, cul-
pability for poverty and responsibility for children's welfare is
shared by both parents and the state. This approach thus moves
beyond a rights-based framework to incorporate a notion of mu-
tual responsibilities.
IV. LESSONS OF THE POVERTY DEFENSE
The poverty defense in civil and criminal child neglect cases
proves that a poverty defense is not the impracticable pipedream
charged by critics. In fact, the poverty defense has made a differ-
ence by keeping some families intact that would otherwise have
their parent-child bonds permanently severed. Its consequences
are concrete. Accordingly, a poverty defense may hold promise for
other areas of the law and cannot be as easily dismissed as its
critics assume. Although the statutes do not define the scope of
the child neglect poverty defense, at least three theoretical ap-
proaches emerge from the case law: (1) coercion; (2) RSB; and (3)
social forfeit. The cases demonstrate that, regardless of the form
of the defense, it will not succeed unless courts have a rich under-
standing of the causes and consequences of poverty. Success does
not mean that parents always win; there are some cases in which
no amount of services or support will lead to acceptable levels of
parenting. The safety and security of children must be para-
mount. Accordingly, success can result when poor families are not
312. Id. at *11 (quoting Doe v. G.D., 370 A.2d 27, 33 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Downey, 377 A.2d 626 (N.J. 1977)).
313. See Eamon & Kopels, supra note 250, at 824 (noting that there is no way to identi-
fy all the cases involving removals of children for reasons of poverty due to that fact that
most legal disputes do not proceed to trial and of those that do, only small percentages are
appealed).
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judged in isolation for their failings, but rather have their chal-
lenges and barriers taken into account within a larger societal
context. Positive outcomes can include more reasonable treat-
ment plans, greater commitment of state resources for families,
and a more careful assessment of whether parental failings are
sufficiently harmful to justify removal.
A. Understanding Poverty
As the cases reveal, many courts simply do not understand or
delve into the causes of poverty and its multi-dimensional effects,
and thereby conflate poverty with culpability.31 ' The prevailing
explanation for poverty in the United States is that behavioral
choices cause poverty." ' In this "culture of poverty" perspective,
the poor make deficient choices that trap them in poverty.116 This
"culture of poverty" theory meshes well with the American myth
of the meritocracy, which holds that anyone can pull themselves
up by their bootstraps with hard work and determination.17 The
flipside of this myth is that a failure to thrive in a capitalist econ-
omy is equated with moral failings." ' A neglectful parent is thus
doubly to blame-she has failed both to succeed economically in a
merit-based system and as a parent. As Martin Guggenheim has
314. See supra notes 22-38, 58-60, 89, 98-110, 159, 161, 168-70, 172-78, 181 and ac-
companying text.
315. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 70 (2007); James Jennings, Persistent Poverty in the United
States: Review of Theories and Explanations, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE
ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS 14, 18-19 (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings eds.,
1999) (summarizing behavioral theories); Frank Munger, Identity as a Weapon in the Mor-
al Politics of Work and Poverty, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF
POVERTY, Low-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3 (Frank Munger
ed., 2002) ("More strictly than other industrialized societies, we measure the worthiness of
all our citizens by the level of their commitment to the labor market .... ).
316. Oscar Lewis first articulated this theory within social science scholarship, con-
cluding that poor people develop their own value system, which perpetuates itself over
generations and is nearly impossible to escape-even if structural conditions change. Os-
car Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 35 TRANSACTION SOC. SCI. & MODERN Soc'Y 7, 7 (1998).
The people in this culture share a "strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of de-
pendency, of not belonging .... Along with this feeling of powerlessness is a widespread
feeling of inferiority, of personal unworthiness." Id.
317. See STEPHEN J. McNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 1-2
(2d ed. 2009); Mark R. Rank, Toward a New Understanding of American Poverty, 20
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 25 (2006).
318. See GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 68 (1981) ('The only dependable route




stated, most observers see child neglect as a family defect, "with
limited or nonexistent societal roots," rather than a problem with
societal roots.319 In light of this paradigm's focus on the individual,
there is little call for collective responsibility or action to reduce
poverty.2 ' Rather, this perspective "provides a justification for do-
ing so little." ' 1
A countervailing narrative of poverty is that structural forces
cause poverty. This structural explanation for poverty holds that
the poor are subject to forces that limit their economic opportuni-
ties and trap them in the underclass.322 For instance, globaliza-
tion, the weakening of unions, and economic shifts from a manu-
facturing base to a service economy have left people lacking
advanced degrees behind.2 ' Likewise, the lack of a living wage,
affordable housing, or child care, keeps even working adults
trapped below the poverty line.324 In addition, a legacy of race dis-
crimination in housing and the workplace, as well as the criminal
justice system, keeps poor people of color isolated from the main-
stream economy. 325 Purely structural responses to poverty are few
and far between, making the "poverty defense" in child neglect
cases unique. Yet, structural explanations do not capture how in-
dividuals, living real lives, respond to and cope with these larger
social and economic forces. For instance, a judge presiding over a
child neglect case cannot ignore a hungry child because the local
steel mill that formerly employed the parent has outsourced its
work to China. The court must deal with the family before it.
Accordingly, a more accurate conception of poverty places indi-
vidual choices within a framework of structural factors. Sociolo-
gist William Julius Wilson, who focuses on low-income, urban,
319. Martin Guggenheim, Issues Surrounding Initial Intervention, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L.
& POLY & ETHICS J. 359, 361 (2005).
320. Rank, supra note 317, at 24.
321. Id. at 25.
322. See ICELAND, supra note 199, at 96; HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 315, at
18; Jennings, supra note 315, at 1-2, 21-26.
323. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 315, at 49; ICELAND, supra note 199, at
76; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 31-33 (2007).
324. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 315, at 151; MASSEY, supra note 323, at
140, 166-68.
325. MASSEY, supra note 323, at 109; MCNAMEE & MILLER, supra note 317, at 192.
"Discrimination arises out of competition for scarce resources and serves to protect group
solidarity." ICELAND, supra note 199, at 80.
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African American communities, first advanced this perspective.326
He acknowledges various social pathologies and dislocations with-
in the underclass, such as crime, teenage pregnancy, and a rise in
single-mother families; however, he places these trends within a
broader social context. 2 7 People who grow up in racially segregat-
ed, poor neighborhoods develop coping mechanisms and responses
that "emerge[ from patterns of racial exclusion" and that ulti-
mately limit social mobility.32 While conservative theorists blame
the poor for making bad choices, Wilson explains that "structural
factors are likely to play a far greater role than cultural factors in
bringing about rapid neighborhood change. ,2 For instance, when
the economy is strong, concentrated poverty and its associated
pathologies decrease and vice versa.331 If culture were as determi-
native as conservative theorists posit, increased economic oppor-
tunity would not have such a great impact in transforming poor
communities."' 1 In short, "[c]ulture mediates the impact of struc-
tural forces such as racial segregation and poverty," and the re-
sultant behavior "often reinforces the very conditions that have
emerged from structural inequities."3 "2 Of course, structural fac-
tors combined with personal choices determine economic status
for everyone, not simply the poor.
In the years since Bazelon proposed the RSB defense, there has
been extensive new psychological and social science research
about how poverty influences behavior."33 Psychologist Craig
Haney surveys this research and concludes that "crime is often
committed by persons whose early lives have been pervaded by a
great many of ... potentially damaging risk factors and whose
present circumstances include numerous environmental stress-
326. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (1987).
327. Id. at 21-22.
328. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE
INNER CITY 43, 134 (2009).
329. Id. at 57, 61. Wilson is widely acknowledged as making it acceptable within aca-
demic circles to discuss cultural factors that contribute to poverty. See Patricia Cohen,
"Culture of Poverty"Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2010, at Al.
330. See WILSON, supra note 328, at 57.
331. Id. (citing PAUL JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE
AMERICAN CITY 145 (1997)).
332. Id. at 133-34.
333. See Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic
of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 856-57, 861-62 (2008) (describing advanc-
es in psychological research since the 1970s). Haney uses this research to recommend
strategies for defense lawyers to use in the mitigation phase of capital cases.
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ors."3 4 Poverty is both a major risk factor and an immediate
stressor .3 " As Haney summarizes, poverty has negative effects on
childhood development, including 'lowered levels of self esteem,
high levels of frustration, poor impulse control, and problematic
intellectual performance and achievement.,
36
Poor children are also exposed to "social toxins," such as violent
neighborhoods and negative role models that skew them toward
delinquency and crime and result in dysfunctional coping mecha-
nisms, such as drug addiction and gang membership.337 Faced
with these risk factors, many poor children grow up to be poor
adults mired in disadvantaged neighborhoods, where there are
high rates of unemployment, transience, and inadequate hous-
ing.338 In turn, these environments can change the way people
think about themselves, make them more likely to give into feel-
ings of desperation, and exert pressure on people to engage in il-
legal conduct.339 In sum, "[rlisk factors have a direct impact on in-
dividual development, increase the likelihood that someone will
be exposed to other potentially debilitating risk factors, and make
it more likely they will be exposed to problematic social contexts
later in life."34
This research suggests that with regard to a poverty defense
there is a role for both the RSB emphasis on social history, as
well as the necessity/duress approach to how financial hardship
can severely restrict the options available to poor parents. To
separate poverty from culpability, actors involved in the child
welfare system will need to better understand this emerging re-
search, and lawyers for parents and children will need to educate
child welfare workers and courts on how structural economic
forces constrain parenting conduct.34' This is not an easy task. To
begin with, child welfare workers are often overworked and over-
334. Id. at 858.
335. See id. at 864-65.
336. Id. at 865.
337. See id. at 871-73.
338. See id. at 873-74.
339. See id. at 874-75.
340. Id. at 875.
341. See TALIA GURSKY ET AL., POVERTY AND CHILD NEGLECT: EXPLORING SOLUTIONS
THROUGH DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 61 (2007), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/uep/degrees/
field project reports/2007/Team3 CFS Report.pdf ("A poverty exemption explicitly stated
in the state's legal code has the potential to disentangle poverty and neglect, but without
specific training or practice to support it, the statute is ineffective.").
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whelmed and have to make difficult decisions about child safety
under pressure.342 Likewise, even though parents are generally
entitled to representation in child dependency hearings and crim-
inal neglect hearings, those lawyers are similarly overburdened
and may not have the time or resources to delve into larger social
issues surrounding poverty and neglect. This is also true for
counsel or guardians ad litem appointed to represent children,34
as well as judges."' Moreover, child neglect hearings usually do
not involve experts testifying on issues such as the availability of
jobs in the local economy, the lack of affordable housing, or the
accessibility of mental health resources.3" While the child welfare
agency may have experts at its disposal, low-income parents can-
not afford their own psychiatrists, therapists, and social workers
to testify on their behalf.46 Further, participants within the child
welfare system, including caseworkers, lawyers, and judges, carry
their own implicit race, gender, and class biases and impose them
on parents, who are disproportionately female, minority, and
347poor.
Despite these obstacles, the poverty defense in child neglect
law can be effective. As the case law exhibits, some judges have
noticed the economic realities facing poor parents or have taken
an inquisitorial role by scrutinizing the findings of the state's ex-
perts. Lawyers for parents, and even some parents themselves,
342. See generally Marcia Robinson Lowry & Sara Bartosz, Why Children Still Need a
Lawyer, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 199, 199-200 (2007).
343. Id. at 207 ("Dependency court lawyers for children are as overburdened as are the
case workers who are responsible for supervising the children's care on a day-to-day ba-
sis.").
344. Id. at 209. ("Family court judges carry enormous case dockets of their own and
must do so with limited administrative support. These judges, therefore, must be able to
rely on the competency and diligent preparation of the social workers and attorneys who
appear before them to advocate for particular case services and permanency goals.").
345. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (discussing the state's
ability to assemble its case as compared to parents).
346. See id. ("The State may call on experts in family relations, psychology, and medi-
cine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will be the
agency's own professional caseworkers whom the State has empowered both to investigate
the family situation and to testify against the parents.").
347. See Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate?" A Critique of Informality in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 352 (1999) ("The professionals in the
system are by and large well-educated, middle-class, and predominantly white. Mean-
while, many of the accused parents and their children are members of racial minority
groups and virtually all are extremely poor with little formal education."); see also Roberts,
supra note 14, at 161, 174 ("Judges and juries also import biases against the poor in apply-
ing the reasonable person standard used to determine neglect.").
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have made compelling arguments about the difficult situations
facing poor parents and the lack of state support. The challenge is
to expand this sort of reasoning and advocacy throughout the
child welfare system, preferably before these cases get to the liti-
gation stage. Possible strategies include increased training for
case workers and other actors within the child welfare system
about the nexus between poverty and neglect and the causes of
poverty. 4 The research is constantly emerging; however, it needs
to be disseminated. Advocates for the poor and legal clinics can
work together to distill localized economic data and to recruit in-
terdisciplinary experts who can translate structural information
for case workers and courts. The child welfare system should also
take better account of strengths within families, rather than fo-
cusing solely on pathologies."9
Beyond individual cases, there have been multiple child wel-
fare class actions that have successfully presented evidence about
structural factors in order to reform child welfare process and to
obtain increased services for low-income children and parents.30
348. See, e.g., Paul Knepper & Shannon M. Barton, Statewide Cross-Training as a
Means of Court Reform in Child Protection Proceedings, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 511, 512
(1997) (describing training sessions for judges, social workers, attorneys, prosecutors, and
other decision-makers designed to improve the child protection court process); see also
Recommendations of the Conference on Achieving Justice: Parents and the Child Welfare
System, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 337, 359 (2001). The working group recommended that:
Ongoing mandatory training should be provided by each agency/organization
in the child welfare system for all players in the system, including, but not
limited to, law enforcement, judges, lawyers, social workers, psychologists,
medical professionals, and mandatory reporters, on how racial and ethnic
stereotypes and sexism can impact decision-making. Training should include
research and information on the unique situation created for parents raising
children with extremely limited financial and limited local services. Training
should include information and discussion on how to distinguish parents
struggling because of poverty from parents who are neglecting their children.
Id.
349. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Changing the Narrative of Child Welfare, 19 GEO. J. ON
Pov. L. & POL'Y 97, 105 (2002) ("[W]ith assets, wealth, power, and strength, we see [the
mother] differently[; w]e learn from her, we admire her, we grow from knowing her.").
350. See, e.g., Hansen v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 238 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). In
Hansen, the court held that the state welfare agency must assist all homeless families to
obtain housing regardless of whether or not children were in the foster care system. Id. at
240. The court considered evidence from a variety of experts and research reports about
the causes and effects of homelessness on children. Id. at 240-41. See generally CHILD
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE
COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 (2005) (analyzing child welfare class action litigation
in thirty-two states); Lowery & Bartosz, supra note 342, at 210 ("Class actions have a
proven track record of producing measurable positive results in reforming large child wel-
fare systems.").
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Class action litigation can typically harness greater advocacy re-
sources than individual cases.3"' The dynamics of poverty and ne-
glect can also be discussed among participants in non-adversarial
child welfare settings, such as family group conferencing and oth-
er fora that are increasingly being set up to address child ne-
glect.5 2 In addition, legislators can be responsive to the effects of
poverty by increasing funding for family support services; after
all, it has been legislatures, not courts, that have largely created
the poverty defense and the right to counsel in child welfare cas-
es.3"3 For the poverty defense to realize its full potential, advo-
cates will need to think creatively and expand their notions of
relevant evidence regarding both parental and state culpability.
Similar strategies would be needed wherever the poverty defense
expands.
B. Expanding the Poverty Defense
Some critics may find child neglect cases an ill-suited founda-
tion for expanding the poverty defense to other areas of the law.
Perhaps child neglect is just too different from other crimes. Then
again, each type of crime has its own definition, required mental
state, pathologies, and causes, and each criminal act arises with-
in its own social context. For these reasons, Professor Stuart
Green has argued that "a proper analysis of the relationship be-
tween distributive and redistributive justice should proceed on a
case-by-case basis."'354 He would consider the appropriateness of a
poverty defense by examining the offense at issue, the precise
form of the offender's disadvantage, and the economic and social
circumstances of the victim.5 Given that the poverty defense has
thus far emerged in response to only one type of wrongful con-
duct, a case-by-case approach based on particular crimes might
351. Class actions can be controversial. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Ju-
risprudence and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 489-90 (1999)
("Class remedies in this area can, however, create additional inequities. Subgroups of chil-
dren within each class action each have needs for resources that in a finite world will be
met only through sacrifices by other subgroups.").
352. See, e.g., Joan Pennell, Mainstrearning Family Group Conferencing: Building and
Sustaining Partnerships, INT'L INST. RESTORATIVE PRAC. (Aug. 7, 1999), http://www.iirp.
edu/articledetail.php?articleid=NDky.
353. See, e.g., Virek S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent's Right to counsel in Child Wel-
fare Cases, 13 MICH. CHILD WELFARE L.J. 2, 4 (2009).
354. Green, supra note 10, at 44.
355. Id. at 59, 70.
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be more achievable than the generalized RSB defense advocated
by Judge Bazelon and Professor Delgado.
Under Professor Green's analysis, it is difficult to excuse or jus-
tify intentionally violent offenses against other people because
the moral underpinnings of these offenses "do not depend on
background considerations of social justice.""3 6 This reasoning
may explain why negligent conduct is sometimes excused in child
welfare law, but intentional acts of abuse are not (even though
many abusive acts are also rooted in RSB backgrounds). For its
part, in 2012, the Supreme Court acknowledged the correlation
between growing up in an environment of severe deprivation and
crime in Miller v. Alabama but would not go as far to excuse the
crime." 7 In Miller, the Court held that life sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders without the possibility of parole violated the
Eighth Amendment's proscription on cruel and unusual punish-
ment.58 The Court stated that a sentence of mandatory life with-
out parole not only ignores scientific research on juvenile brain
development, but also "prevents taking into account the family
and home environment that surrounds [the defendant]-and from
which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal
or dysfunctional." '359 The Court pointed out that the defendants
whose cases were on appeal came from deprived backgrounds,
commenting with regard to one of them,
if ever a pathological background might have contributed to a 14-
year-old's commission of a crime, it is here. Miller's stepfather physi-
cally abused him; his alcoholic and drug-addicted mother neglected
him; he had been in and out of foster care as a result; and he had
tried to kill himself four times, the first when he should have been in
kindergarten.
360
Still, the Court demonstrated no willingness to excuse liability
with regard to homicide, stating, "[t]hat Miller deserved severe
punishment for killing [the victim] is beyond question.,,36 1 The
Court did not explain why the RSB that supports mitigation of
punishment does not also lessen liability. Others have argued
356. Id. at 63.
357. No. 10-9646, slip op. at 1, 16 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
358. Id. at 16.
359. Id. at 15.
360. Id. at 16.
361. Id.
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that mitigation of punishment fits more comfortably within our
legal system than does amelioration of liability.62
Yet punishment is not the only option for dealing with wrong-
ful conduct. Depending on the crime, there may be creative op-
tions for excusing defendants while serving retributive and deter-
rence functions of the criminal law. For instance, in the child
welfare system, greater resources and services for poor parents
can often eliminate the "crime" altogether and ensure safety and
security for children. 6 ' For those parents whose RSB makes them
unable to meet their children's needs even with state support, a
variety of options can excuse their conduct while keeping children
safe. Parents with an RSB defense could lose physical custody of
their children while retaining visitation rights, so that family ties
are not permanently severed.364 Alternatively, RSB parents could
have the opportunity to petition to reinstate their parental rights
in the future as their circumstances improve.35 Accordingly, in
considering potential poverty defenses across the legal spectrum,
it is important to remember that not all offenses pose the quan-
dary facing Judge Bazelon. In some cases, flexible and just solu-
tions may be available to excuse and support defendants while
protecting the interests of victims and society.
A poverty defense to non-violent crimes, in particular, avoids
the public safety quandary. Starting with these crimes, a poverty
defense may help to sharpen our assessment of individual and so-
cietal culpability and thereby produce more accurate judicial de-
362. See, e.g., Hefferman, supra note 74, at 70-72.
363. See, e.g., Public Awareness & Creating Supportive Communities, CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, http://www.childwelfare-gov/preventing/communities (last visited Dec. 10,
2012).
364. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 425
(1983) ("[P]ermanent placement that permits continued contact is better than adoption or
any other placement that entails a total loss of contact with the natural parent.').
365. Nine states have statutes that permit parents to petition for reinstatement of pa-
rental rights following a termination. See Reinstatement of Parental Rights, NAT'L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/reinstatement-
of-parental-rights-state-statute-sum.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). In relevant part, the
NCSL has stated:
If a permanent placement has not been achieved within a specific timeframe,
a petition may be filed with the court requesting reinstatement of the par-
ent's rights. If the court determines that the parent is now able to provide a
safe home for the child, the request may be granted. The laws were developed
in response to children who were aging out of the foster care system and re-
establishing ties with parents and family members.
[Vol. 47:495
THE POVERTY DEFENSE
cisions, more generous crime prevention strategies, and more ef-
fective interventions. The poverty defense could eliminate the in-
equity that arises in a system that punishes the wrongdoing of
the poor with incarceration, while imposing lenient fines and reg-
ulatory controls on more affluent wrongdoers." ' Of course, a pov-
erty defense is not the only way to avoid criminalizing poverty.
Alternatives include mitigating punishments based on a defend-
ant's poverty or decriminalizing certain conduct altogether. The
possible advantages of the poverty defense are that it allows de-
fendants to avoid the collateral consequences that accompany
convictions, such as barriers to future employment and housing,
as well as loss of certain public benefits and voting rights. A pov-
erty defense also retains the law's expressive effect of declaring
certain conduct undesirable. The ideal solution is the elimination
of poverty, which would make the poverty defense unnecessary.
Until then, the poverty defense can break the assumed link be-
tween poverty and culpability.
Crimes appropriate for a poverty defense might include "vic-
timless" crimes committed almost exclusively by the poor, includ-
ing the crimes related to homelessness, drug use, truancy, and
turnstile jumping. These crimes are different from child neglect
(in which the justice system is moving to protect a victim), but
they are similarly rooted in poverty. In addition, the defense
could extend to crimes of poverty-that is, crimes that people en-
gage in for economic survival-such as public benefits fraud, low-
level drug dealing, panhandling, prostitution and minor thefts.0 "
The defense might also cover crimes poor people commit in order
to survive in a dangerous community, such as unlawful posses-
sion of a weapon. In addition, the poverty defense in child neglect
cases should be adopted in the twenty-five states that currently
lack the defense or, better yet, incorporated into Title 42 of the
United States Code, the federal law that funds the foster care
system."0 9 As the justice system gains more experience with the
poverty defense and becomes more sophisticated in understand-
ing poverty, the defense can be expanded to other forms of wrong-
ful conduct.
367. Barbara Hudson, Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference, in
FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10.
368. Id. at 212 n.3 (defining crimes of poverty as those "whose rates are particularly
sensitive to changes in employment and other economic indicators").
369. 42 U.S.C. § 674 (2006).
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The social forfeit strain in child neglect law is particularly
helpful in conceptualizing an expanded poverty defense. Courts
using a social forfeit model examine the conduct and choices of
both parents and the state in determining the causes and solu-
tions for alleged neglect. This model does not absolve individual
wrongful conduct but rather apportions it in a context in which it
can be better understood and hopefully ameliorated. It provides a
theoretical basis for moving beyond individual responsibility to-
ward a model of mutual dependency, in which citizens and the
state not only claim rights but also owe each other responsibili-
ties. Criminal justice scholars assume that such a "thick" view of
citizen-state relationships is normatively impossible and/or theo-
retically undesirable."' But they have failed to notice the social
forfeit strain in child neglect case law and how this approach
could provide a framework for similarly thick approaches to other
areas of the law. Judge Bazelon and Professor Delgado argue that
society should be put on trial; the child neglect case law shows
that this is possible without absolving individual responsibility. 7'
While some courts are concerned about letting poor parents off
the hook for conduct that would penalize richer parents, it is hard
to conclude that the poverty defense gives poor parents a free
pass to neglect their children. The child welfare system scrutiniz-
es allegedly neglectful poor parents, removes their children from
their homes, and mandates parental compliance with extensive
case plans.37 Even with a poverty defense, these parents must
demonstrate the capacity, initiative, and responsibility to im-
prove their parenting.
The alternative to the poverty defense is removal of children
and termination of parental rights, and sometimes incarceration
of parents. Yet foster care is no panacea, as there is ample evi-
dence that remaining in a setting of parental neglect is usually
more beneficial for children than foster care.373 Similarly, while
370. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 62, at 152-53 (discussing problems with both the ap-
plication and theoretical underpinnings at social forfeit theory); Taslitz, supra note 61, at
81-82 (arguing that society cannot be held responsible for individual crimes).
371. Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 388-89, 401-02; Delga-
do, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 75, 77-78.
372. See supra Section II.
373. See Fraidin, supra note 287, at 25-30 (explaining why many maltreated children
would fare better if left at home than if placed in foster care); see also Theo Liebmann,
What's Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive, Realistic, and
Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 141, 141-43 (2006).
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incarceration is an easy, albeit expensive, way to punish crimi-
nals, it has proven devastating to families and communities.3 74 A
poverty defense can lead to more preventative programs by forc-
ing decision makers to confront the paucity of alternatives avail-
able to defendants."' When poor Americans lack viable alterna-
tives for avoiding wrongful conduct, individual culpability
lessens.
There is no evidence that the poverty defense has stigmatized
individuals or communities by denying the poor moral agency. It
does not presume that poor parents are culturally incapable of
raising their children. Rather, the poverty defense recognizes that
structural features within our society create financial hardship
that sometimes leads to inadequate parenting. Furthermore, the
defense is not applied in a blanket fashion; each defendant must
show how her unique RSB or current economic condition excuses
her specific conduct.376 Most poor parents are not charged with
neglect, and the poverty defense indirectly acknowledges the re-
silience of these families in the face of economic inequality. As
Thomas Ross has written, "Against all odds, facing social stigma
and working through maddening systems of public assistance, the
Professor Liebmann states:
The 520,000 children in foster care often live in unsafe and unsanitary condi-
tions, with poorly trained foster parents and without crucial mental health,
medical, and education services. Even worse, children in foster care are
abused and neglected at a greater rate than other children, and have an in-
creased risk of delinquency and other behavioral problems. The longer-term
statistics are equally bleak. In a recent broad survey, foster alumni had dis-
proportionately more mental health disorders, significantly lower employ-
ment rates, less health insurance coverage, and a higher rate of homelessness
when compared with the general population.
Id.
374. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 1281 (discussing how mass incarceration harms Af-
rican American communities); cf, Fraidin, supra note 287, at 25-26 (discussing how chil-
dren removed from families because of suspected neglect are worse off in foster care). For a
discussion of the costs of incarceration see JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POL'v
RES., THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 10 (2010), available at http://www.
cepr.netldocuments/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf ("In 2008, federal, state, and
local governments spent nearly $75 billion on corrections, with the large majority on in-
carceration.").
375. One emerging preventative approach is called differential response, which is a
voluntary system for families where there is no immediate risk to children. GURSKY ET AL.,
supra note 341, at 9. In differential response programs, families are diverted from the
child welfare system into preventative programs run by community, non-profit organiza-
tions. Id. These programs have proven to be cost-effective. Id. at 10.
376. See Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 66 ('[T]he theory re-
quires that a jury determine whether, in this particular defendant's case, a rotten social
background amounts to a disability falling within a particular excusing condition.").
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poor have survived. Many poor women and men have kept their
families together and maintained safe and decent lives in the
midst of conditions that would seem to make family disintegra-
tion inescapable."3" There is already a stigma to being poor in our
society, but the stigma of being a neglectful parent is even
worse."' Thus far, the poverty defense has proven more helpful
than harmful, not only keeping families together, but also giving
some parents increased services and support.
For some critics, this is simply too much-a poverty defense
cannot and should not bear the weight of redistributive aims.
This critique, however, is diminished in the context of child ne-
glect, where the poverty defense has been primarily a legislative
creation. This limits condemnation of unelected jurists run
amuck, and suggests a political avenue for expansion of the pov-
erty defense to other realms. At bottom, however, the critics are
correct in that the poverty defense has not worked "a massive
transformation of our social structure" and is unlikely to do so."'
A poverty defense does not reduce poverty, and parents in the
child welfare system remain poor. However, the poverty defense
shines a light on poverty, its effects, and the constrained choices
it imposes. Understanding the problem is the first step towards
fixing it. The ultimate goal is a shift from retributive penal poli-
cies to redistributive social policies, and greater safety and secu-
rity for all. As Judge Bazelon stated, "[R]ather than conceding the
inevitability of social injustice and seeking the serenity to accept
it, we must recognize its intolerability and search for the strength
to change it.""
CONCLUSION
A poverty defense is not merely a hypothetical exercise, as is
often assumed. Rather, there is a widespread poverty defense
within the law of civil and criminal child neglect, and some fami-
lies have remained together as a result of the defense. The pov-
377. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L. J. 1499, 1543 (1991).
378. In addition, there is the stigma and collateral consequences of being listed perma-
nently on a child abuse and neglect registry. See W. Todd Miller, The Central Registry
Statute for Abuse and Neglect Matters is Constitutionally Flawed, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB.
POLeY 651, 652 (2011).
379. Morse, supra note 4, at 158.
380. Bazelon, Rejoinder, supra note 48, at 1273.
[Vol. 47:495
THE POVERTY DEFENSE
erty defense can make a difference. However, the poverty defense
only fulfills its potential when actors in the child welfare system
have a rich understanding of the causes and consequences of pov-
erty. When the child welfare system conflates poverty with culpa-
bility and ignores the structural realities of our economy, families
are torn apart, children suffer, and society pays social and eco-
nomic costs. By contrast, when the child welfare system views
poverty as structurally rooted, the poverty defense not only as-
sists individual poor defendants, but also benefits society more
widely through redistributive consequences that can ultimately
reduce crime.
At its worst, the poverty defense fools us into thinking that we
are compassionate about the challenges facing poor parents,
when, in fact, we remove thousands of poor children from their
parents each year. At its best, the poverty defense forces the child
welfare system to confront the link between poverty and child ne-
glect and to consider societal responsibility for that link. In short,
the poverty defense in child neglect cases reveals that such a de-
fense is neither as radically subversive of American law as its
critics contend, nor as revolutionary as its proponents pronounce.
It is, however, remarkable in American law.
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